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ABSTRACT 
Givens, Adam Thomas. M.A., Department of History, Wright State University, 2011.  
The Air Close to the Trees: Evolution and Innovation in U.S. Army Assault Helicopter 
Units during the Vietnam War.  
 
 
 
Throughout the Vietnam War the United States Army‘s use of assault helicopters was 
unprecedented in modern warfare. Although planners originally anticipated their 
utilization on a European battlefield rather than against an insurgency, Army Aviation 
adapted, allowing them to overcome an uncertain future. Due to the unconventional 
nature of the conflict, continual revisions in tactics, techniques, and procedures ensured 
that assault helicopter doctrine was never concrete, but always shifting. Multiple factors 
influenced these developments, and manifold channels of dissemination allowed combat 
knowledge ultimately to influence training and doctrine. This thesis finds that previous 
works focus too heavily upon the initial large-scale airmobile battle, ignoring the more 
profound aspects of later experiences. Using memoirs, official Army documents, service 
journals, and personal papers, it argues that innovation amongst assault helicopter units 
occurred throughout the entirety of the American involvement in Vietnam, signifying a 
youthful Army Aviation that was amenable to varied and innovative thinking from within 
its ranks.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 Few of America‘s past wars have engendered as much passion, continued 
supposition, and even confusion as the Vietnam War. Indeed, the name itself is for some 
descriptive of an ill-advised endeavor – an era of torment or an unending conflict with no 
discernable end. If Vietnam is synonymous with a situation gone wrong, then there is one 
central image which has become a ubiquitous symbol of the American presence in 
Southeast Asia: the helicopter. Its rotor noise was the soundtrack for a generation sent to 
fight in the region‘s forests, jungles, and rice paddies. Nightly news reports often brought 
combat to the nation‘s living rooms, and more often than not helicopters were the central 
image depicted, further connecting war and machine in the public consciousness. 
Arguably, few symbols have become so inextricably linked to a conflict in which United 
States forces were involved. 
  This thesis argues that, rather than enjoying comprehensive formulaic 
employment, assault helicopter tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the United 
States Army during the Vietnam War underwent continual revision. It posits that this was 
not only a product of combat expediency, but the result of open-mindedness within Army 
Aviation which allowed new ideas to become useful doctrine. Much of the previous 
literature on airmobility details the evolution of the concept preceding Vietnam, but few 
trace the Army‘s evolution of techniques, tactics, and procedures throughout the war. 
Incorrectly, one might assume from this historiographical lacuna that helicopter crews‘
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standard operating procedures remained in stasis and were standardized throughout 
Vietnam, leaving nothing of any great importance worth examining. There is much to be 
learned, though, from an analysis of the era between American escalation and
withdrawal.  
  The 1950s and early 1960s witnessed considerable theorizing and testing by the 
Army regarding the employment of helicopters on a modern field of battle. The entire 
concept of utilizing the aircraft as troop carriers was a product of the Cold War – military 
planners intended to use them on a European battlefield against large-scale communist 
incursions, not in Southeast Asia against an insurgency. As a result of an immediate need, 
however, Army forces adapted airmobility operations to the ―brushfire war‖ mentality of 
small regional conflicts.  
 The 1
st
 Cavalry Division, the first airmobile division, garners the lion‘s share of 
notice in the historical record. Their combat debut in late 1965 and subsequent first 
victory during the Battle of Ia Drang is without doubt a groundbreaking moment – it 
upheld over a decade of prior theorizing about the airmobility concept. Yet, Ia Drang 
signaled only the beginning of assault helicopter‘s wide-scale usage and evolution during 
the Vietnam War. Army Aviation‘s extensive use of rotary-wing aircraft was not a fait 
accompli, nor was their implementation something they inherently knew how to 
accomplish easily. It took considerable efforts by those among the aviation and ground 
forces to translate experiences into agreed-upon doctrine.  
 Most scholars have done an excellent job detailing the bureaucratic measures 
which fostered the development of the helicopter and its first large implementation by the 
1
st
 Cavalry. Regarding airmobility‘s transition to its role in counterinsurgency, however, 
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there are far fewer studies. With that in mind, multiple questions drive this work: namely, 
how well did the Army‘s ideas about the employment of helicopters hold up under the 
stresses of combat? How did tactics and doctrine evolve, what caused them to change, 
and what were the mechanics which allowed the implementation of new ideas? Broadly 
speaking, was the Army interested in using Southeast Asia as a test-bed for universal 
doctrine or did they intend to keep tactical lessons applicable to Vietnam strictly within 
that theater? By addressing and answering these questions, this thesis intends not to find 
fault in previous treatments but to augment them in an attempt to fill a historiographical 
gap. 
 Among the varied literature, one of the best scholarly works to explore pre-
Vietnam Army Aviation is historian Christopher C.S. Cheng‘s Air Mobility. He offers a 
thorough examination of doctrine and organization from 1942 through 1965. Cheng ends, 
though, at the initial large-scale involvement of American forces in Vietnam, leaving 
many questions unanswered about how doctrine changed after battlefield experiences. He 
concludes at 1965 ―because the creation of an air mobile division can represent the 
fulfillment of an innovation.‖
1
 It may be true that the initial vision of airmobility was 
fulfilled in that year, though one wonders about the performance of the concept. Cheng 
ends his work at the headwaters of some of the most rapid innovation the air assault 
concept underwent during the war.  
 The same abrupt conclusion to Cheng‘s work is present in another equally 
respectable analysis. John M. Carland‘s Association of the United States Army-sponsored 
paper, ―How We Got There: Air Assault Warfare and the Emergence of the 1
st
 Cavalry 
                                                 
1
  Christopher C.S. Cheng, Air Mobility: The Development of a Doctrine (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 
xiv.  
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Division (Airmobile), 1950-1965,‖ details the emergence of the airmobile concept, but 
also ends before its battlefield application.
2
 Despite this thorough analysis, the era 
between the 1
st
 Cavalry‘s activation and what they experienced during combat is still 
overshadowed by the revolutionary aspect of the airmobile division. It is important to 
examine how their combat experience affected later actions, or how well the division‘s 
extensive training prepared them for fighting North Vietnamese regulars and what they 
did as a result to address lessons learned.  
 Other works closely related to Carland‘s also deal with the developmental stage. 
Bureaucratic pressures in the early 1960s from Secretary of Defense Robert S. 
McNamara led to a reevaluation of the Army‘s ability on the modern battlefield. 
McNamara ordered large-scale testing to determine the applicability of the helicopter into 
airborne operations and the Army commissioned the Howze Board to outline 
recommendations for forming dedicated airmobile units.
3
 Mark A. Olinger‘s Institute of 
Land Warfare Paper ―Conceptual Underpinnings of the Air Assault Concept‖ elucidates 
well the governmental pressures to develop airmobility.
4
 He ends in 1964, however, 
when the stateside testing concluded and the Army formed the first airmobile division. 
 John R. Galvin‘s Air Assault also highlights the development of airmobility. Like 
Cheng and Carland, the author covers the birth of the concept, but begins earlier, tracing 
its lineage to World War II parachute operations. Only the final twenty pages of the 360 
                                                 
2
   John M. Carland, ―How We Got There: Air Assault and the Emergence of the 1st Air Cavalry Division 
(Airmobile), 1950-1965,‖ The Land Warfare Papers, no. 42 (Arlington, VA: The Institute of Land Warfare, 
2003). 
3
 The Board‘s name derives from its Chairman, Major General Hamilton H. Howze, who became the first 
Director of Army Aviation. Officially it was called the U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board.   
4
  Mark A. Olinger, Conceptual Underpinnings of The Air Assault Concept: The Hogaboom, Rogers and 
Howze Boards, The Land Warfare Papers, no. 60W (Arlington, VA: The Institute of Land Warfare, 2006). 
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total, however, deal specifically with the post-1965 era. Published in 1969, Galvin could 
only cover some aspects of the Vietnam War, and to expect his work to contain a detailed 
interpretive analysis of the continual developing nature of airmobile operations is perhaps 
unrealistic. However, his research is helpful in outlining the transformation from an 
Army which relied upon large-scale airborne assaults by parachute to one which 
developed a dependency on helicopters. 
 Perhaps the most authoritative examination of the employment of helicopters in 
Vietnam is Lieutenant General John J. Tolson‘s Airmobility.
5
 A central figure in Army 
Aviation, Tolson gives a detailed history of how doctrine transformed from the 
theoretical to the battlefield-proven. An Army-commissioned study published in 1972, 
his work deals broadly with all aspects of airmobility and its development. While it may 
be the best overall look at the helicopter‘s role throughout Vietnam and the subsequent 
evolution of its application, there are many aspects which he deals with only in passing. 
He pays little attention to the actual mechanics of gathering information learned on the 
battlefield and how the Army disseminated those lessons for inclusion in training 
programs. The lack of historical distance, the author‘s own personal relation to the 
subject matter, and the fact that is a governmental history constrict what is otherwise the 
authoritative work on airmobility.  
 Such dedicated analysis of the formative era of heli-borne warfare is useful to 
understand the framework which existed in the early usage of airmobility in Vietnam. 
Most works agree that airmobility was one of the most significant innovations to come 
out of the war in Southeast Asia. Despite this near universal conformity, however, few 
                                                 
5
 John J. Tolson, Airmobility, 1961-1971 (Department of the Army, Washington D.C., 1973). 
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works have attempted to understand the profound expansion and progression of 
helicopter usage other than through superficial examinations of battlefield expediencies. 
The maturation of airmobility was not an accomplished fact when the 1
st
 Cavalry 
Division landed in 1965. Rather, throughout the war, and even into 1971, Army Aviation 
continually learned and refined their assault helicopter tactics and techniques.  
 In order to understand that Army Aviation did not arrive in Southeast Asia with a 
solid framework of how to fight an insurgency, the first chapter offers an historical 
overview of the era preceding large-scale operations in Vietnam. It is largely an 
institutional history which traces not only the early difficulties of helicopter proponents, 
but illustrates how important Vietnam was to solidifying the use of helicopters as a viable 
combat asset. Army Aviation‘s ascendancy to become a respected force was not easy. A 
mixed reaction Army-wide regarding helicopters began in the 1950s, continuing into the 
1960s. This is not particularly surprising, though, as groundbreaking military 
advancements often meet some amount of obduracy and dubiety – mechanized warfare in 
the interwar period and Billy Mitchell‘s own struggles are only two examples. Extensive 
use of helicopters in Vietnam proved no different.  
 The Army found themselves pulled in two opposite directions, requiring them to 
prepare for a European war while also remaining capable of fighting any other 
contingency. Forming a general purpose airmobility capability was easier said than done. 
By and large the Army focused more intently on a European foe, believing that 
preparations against a sophisticated enemy could be easily adapted to meet a less-
advanced opposition. With that mindset they sent the first helicopters to the Republic of 
Vietnam in 1961. From a small commitment of three dozen aircraft, their numbers grew 
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exponentially in the following years, proving detractors wrong who believed the 
helicopter had little utility beyond a simple logistical or medical evacuation platform. 
While simultaneous testing and support for their use in a European war continued, the 
demands of Vietnam ultimately eclipsed those plans. 
  Army Aviation adjusted rapidly to a counterinsurgency. With the airmobile 
division‘s successful employment, Europe became an ever-more distant worry. In that 
way, rotary-wing aircraft found new purpose and immediate usefulness in an 
environment far removed from the one originally envisioned. The 1
st
 Cavalry Division‘s 
success allowed for a speedy expansion of Army Aviation, as the overall American 
commander in Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland, believed helicopter mobility 
was the panacea to the perplexing insurgency quandary. Ia Drang and the larger Pleiku 
Campaign in which that battle took place offered many lessons. Foremost among them 
was that airmobility, while proven effectual in a non-conventional setting, still had jagged 
edges in need of smoothing – something only further combat could provide.  
  Chapter two discusses Army Aviation‘s acclimation to a counterinsurgency. 
Throughout the Vietnam War, assault helicopter units continually adapted and refined 
their tactics and procedures. Four main factors influenced these developments: the 
Army‘s increasing reliance on helicopters to fight a war of attrition meant they took on 
more pronounced roles, requiring alterations in procedures and tactics; large-scale 
employment of the aircraft meant both the aviation and infantry communities had to learn 
how to interact with one another – helicopter units had to ―educate‖ their ground 
counterparts about how to use them properly; attempts to standardize techniques and 
procedures were not easily accomplished due to varied geographic and tactical 
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environments; and, finally, the enemy‘s ability to revise their own methods necessitated 
commensurate tactical and procedural responses from helicopter units. Prior scholarship 
hints at these realities in varying degrees, but mostly in terms of technological 
developments.  
 Army Aviation‘s concerted efforts to develop reliable doctrine can be found in the 
methods they used to disseminate their insights. Chapter three examines the varied ways 
that ideas, observations, and combat knowledge found a wide audience during Vietnam. 
It argues that without these communication networks, innovation and revision could not 
have been as quick or dynamic. Through official reports, service journals, stateside 
training, and in-country orientation, the Army was able to gather, disseminate, and 
redistribute a vast array of data. By taking advantage of multiple channels of 
communication, Army Aviation tied doctrine, training, and even personnel issues closely 
with the war in Vietnam. In many cases these multifarious ideas and methods never made 
it into official Army manuals. This thesis does not examine such source material in-depth 
for this reason, but also because manuals are fundamentally the ultimate destination for 
well-regulated ideas.
6
 They constitute an official articulation of doctrine and tactics 
which, while informative, fail to illuminate the pace of change, the nuanced thought 
emanating from the combat zone, and the degree to which real innovation took place. 
 In addition to Army Aviation‘s communication of thoughts amongst themselves, 
their youth compared to their more established service branch brethren also proved 
                                                 
6
 To an extent the Army understood the impossibility of detailing all the varied methods available to the 
helicopter pilot. The 1969 field manual, FM 1-105: Army Aviation Techniques and Procedures, makes 
known that it provides only ―condensed coverage‖ of only the ―basic methods.‖ Furthermore, the staff who 
compiled the manual understood that the ―variations and combinations the aviator may use in adapting to 
the many situations to be encountered are almost limitless.‖ Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-105: 
Army Aviation Techniques and Procedures (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1969), 1-1.  
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beneficial. Given the nascence of airmobility and their developing use of helicopters in 
such significant roles, there were few impediments to formulating doctrine. One would 
have been hard pressed to find obstinate traditionalists upholding a battle-tested approach 
versus a revised method. Indeed, in the early years of the Vietnam War there was no 
battle-tested experience to fall back upon, no historic precedent of U.S. assault 
helicopters in a counterinsurgency role. As a consequence, most aviators were open to 
somewhat radical ideas.   
 This work focuses on Army assault helicopters for specific reasons, the principal 
one being because they represent the central element of the airmobility concept.
7
 Though 
all helicopters assisted ground units in some manner, the utility helicopter, which made 
up the bulk of assault helicopter battalion, companies, and platoons, was the most widely-
used aircraft during the Vietnam War. These aircraft – most often after 1965 the Bell UH-
1 ―Huey‖ – hauled troops to and from the combat zone; carried munitions, supplies, and 
equipment to ground troops; acted as command and control aircraft for greater tactical 
control; and generally fulfilled whatever role needed. Indeed, the hallmark of the assault 
helicopter unit was their inherent versatility, which the Army believed ―should not be 
restricted to a single type operation.‖
8
 When viewed in this light, assault helicopters were 
the most versatile of all the helicopters employed in Southeast Asia. The Army‘s Huey 
was also the most visible aircraft of the Vietnam War, the iconic image. The Vietnam 
Helicopter Pilots Association reports that of the 10,005 production Hueys, the Army took 
receipt of 9,216 of them, the majority being troop-carrying variants. While the other 
                                                 
7
 The term ―assault helicopter‖ is intended as a catch-all. Technically, the Army‘s designation of such 
aviation units changed throughout the war, from Transportation, to Air Mobile (Light), and finally Assault 
Helicopter. Their functions and roles were not affected by any re-designations.  
8
 United States Army Aviation School, Common Subjects and Reference Data for Army Aviation in the 
Field Army, January 1968 (Fort Rucker, AL: United States Army Aviation School, 1968), 81.  
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service branches also used the Huey, the Marine Corps was the second most prevalent 
user of the aircraft behind the Army with only 127 in their inventory.
9
 The sheer number 
of these helicopters used by the Army, their wide usage, and their centrality to airmobility 
makes it important to examine the use of the assault helicopter in-depth.  
  Other types of Army rotary-wing aircraft experienced innovation and alterations 
in role and method as well. One should not underestimate the groundbreaking nature of 
the attack helicopter (AH), cargo helicopter (CH), and observation helicopter (OH). 
There still remains a wealth of information hidden in the historical record about these 
helicopters in Vietnam, not yet illuminated by historians of this topic. In the interest of 
scope and space, though, this study must only shine a weak beam on a comparably small 
issue; regardless of the many aspects of airmobility, it focuses on a central facet of the 
concept‘s innovation. Furthermore, library shelves strain under the weight of works 
which detail perceived errors by the Army in both how they viewed and executed the 
war. This project‘s intent is not to determine whether the Army‘s wide use of assault 
helicopters was the proper approach or not, but how the aircraft, men, and institution met 
the challenges they faced. To that end, discussions of overarching national policy, 
strategy, and policy of the United States are confined to their relation to Army assault 
helicopters.  
 It is at this point necessary to define the terminology common to studies of this 
topic. The terms ―air assault‖ and ―airmobility‖ are used interchangeably. Some made 
distinctions in the early era of the airmobility debate. Air assault, they argued, was the 
integration of aircraft into an organizational division. Airmobility, on the other hand, they 
                                                 
9
 Gary Roush, ―Helicopter Losses during the Vietnam War,‖ accessed June 4, 2011, 
http://www.vhpa.org/heliloss.pdf. 
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considered the capability of moving men and equipment by air. Tactics, techniques, and 
procedures are simple terms intended to describe sometimes complicated functions or 
concepts. In the following pages, they describe the manner in which assault helicopter 
units executed missions, including formations, altitudes, landing zone approaches and 
preparations, anti-aircraft defense measures, and various other methods common to 
combat operations. This thesis does not laboriously enumerate the varied and complicated 
aspects of these, because, in many ways it would be an impossible task. Helicopter units 
devised so many unique procedures that collecting and presenting them by region and 
time would be not only onerous to both compiler and reader, but also somewhat 
valueless. Unless well-versed in the mechanics and execution of such tactics and 
principles of helicopter warfare, the detail would largely obfuscate the overall argument – 
that there actually was evolution and innovation throughout the Vietnam War, rather than 
what those particular components might have been.   
  In sum, this study can illuminate what remains an overlooked and opaque 
element of the Vietnam War. The evolution of assault helicopter tactics was not 
necessarily something unique in warfare. Indeed, for an application of a new technology 
to become effective there must be an era of refinement which combines lessons learned 
from past experiences into a program of efficiency. When operations began in 1961, 
Army pilots had no combat experience from which to derive a doctrinal approach to the 
operations they were tasked with performing. Their initial experiences may have given 
insight into the possibilities of the helicopter, but it fell upon those who came later to 
redefine the limits of Army Aviation‘s capabilities. Each generation of American 
helicopter pilots who have followed can trace their tactical lineage to Southeast Asia. 
12 
 
 
 
Indeed, for the better part of almost two decades, the Vietnam War was the only major 
basis of combat-tested knowledge from which the U.S. Army could derive combat 
experience. Despite being a vibrant era for helicopter advancements, the Vietnam War 
was only the first chapter – the densest chapter – in what remains an evolving narrative 
still today.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE EARLY YEARS 
 
 Army Aviation experienced a hectic decade before they began operations in 
Southeast Asia. They did not arrive as a force with explicit combat-proven doctrine. 
What they did benefit from before large-scale employment of assault helicopters, 
however, were important moments of action and thought. Their journey began with small 
steps. Pre-Vietnam rivalry steeled the nascent organization, as their use of helicopters 
was experimental and even controversial, causing interservice friction. In the early Cold 
War milieu of deterrence and potential nuclear war they struggled to legitimize their 
proposed role. Though helicopters were not the central component of a revised strategy, 
visionary members inside the Army and the government championed a military more 
dependent upon the aircraft. Airmobility evolved significantly during this short time, and 
helicopters found new relevance in an unlikely environment. Military planners altered 
their focus from the main contingency of a war against the Eastern Bloc to a growing 
insurgency in Vietnam. Army Aviation transitioned to meet the guerilla threat while 
simultaneously testing stateside the revolutionary concept of an airmobile division. 
Antiquated equipment, constricting command relationships, and lack of concrete doctrine 
hampered early wartime efforts. However, experience gained in both Vietnam and the 
United States assisted in improving future capabilities. The airmobile division‘s first 
battle in 1965 was the culmination of year‘s worth of theorizing and training, but only the 
initial evaluation of large-scale helicopter warfare.     
14 
 
 
 
Early Proponents  
 Army Major General James M. Gavin was one of the earliest influential 
proponents of airmobility. Already known for his innovative spirit and visionary outlook 
while commanding the 82
nd
 Airborne Division during World War II, his April 1954 
Harper’s magazine article signals the beginning of an embryonic debate. The aptly titled 
―Cavalry, and I Don‘t Mean Horses‖ proposed that helicopters offered increased 
―momentum.‖ Arguing that the nuclear age necessitated highly mobile forces dispersed 
over vast terrain, Gavin suggested a combined armor and air cavalry. With an image of 
the European battlefield in mind, he asserted that ―in ground combat the mobility 
differential we lack will be found in the air vehicle.‖
10
  
 Throughout the 1950s, the incipient airmobility concept began to gain support 
among influential proponents within the Army. The helicopter‘s combat usefulness had 
become apparent during the Korean War (1950-1953), when they used modest numbers 
of them to fly logistical missions or as medical evacuation vehicles. The United States 
Marine Corps (USMC), not the Army, was the first branch to use successfully helicopters 
in combat situations as became common practice in Vietnam. Throughout the Korean 
War, Marines experimented with rotary-wing aircraft to supply and transport infantry, 
capably relocating entire battalions.
11
 Upon witnessing the utility of USMC helicopters, 
Army General Matthew Ridgway, acting as Commanding General of Far East Command, 
suggested in 1951 that the Department of Defense create up to four transportation 
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helicopter battalions for the Army.
12
 Though his recommendation was reduced to two 
companies, the request indicates the growing significance of the aircraft to forward-
thinking individuals. 
  In August 1954 the Army took further steps to develop their own organic aviation 
capabilities, reactivating the once defunct Camp Rucker for use as the Army Aviation 
School. In October 1955 aviation found a permanent home there, re-designated Fort 
Rucker.
13
 Given President Dwight D. Eisenhower‘s policy of massive retaliation, though, 
the Army struggled to explain their legitimacy in an era where military action would be 
dominated by their service cousins‘ high-flying strategic bombers.
14
 United States Air 
Force (USAF) staff officers hinted that the only usefulness of traditional Army infantry in 
the nuclear age would be to act as security forces for missile and bomber bases. With 
budgetary restrictions from Eisenhower‘s ―New Look,‖ military planners clamored to 
prove they were still relevant. The Navy, USAF, and USMC all made efforts to 
implement helicopters in their operations. Compared to the Army, though, others had to 
maintain extensive and expensive fixed-wing units simultaneously, detracting from their 
budgets and willingness to implement rotary-wing aircraft in a large scale.  
 The Army, however, saw the opportunity to utilize the burgeoning technology and 
marry it with a reworked strategy. In this milieu, their strategists adapted helicopters from 
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a limited role to an important tactical machine. Mobility, the era‘s buzz word in the 
military community, became the focus when anticipating Soviet armor storming across 
the plains of Europe. A larger battlefield due to the range and lethality of nuclear 
weapons meant conventional ground transportation would prove too slow and vulnerable. 
For that reason, planners believed helicopters necessary to quickly insert troops and 
supplies where needed. They understood the future battlefield to be one ―characterized by 
fluid operations of units dispersed under the threat or actual use of nuclear weapons.‖
15
 
Wishing to enhance infantry mobility, they hoped to ―break free of the ground barrier,‖ 
doing so by turning ―to Army Aviation and the airspace just above the earth‘s surface as a 
partial answer to its needs.‖
16
 Realizing that nuclear weapons altered how armies would 
fight future wars, Army Chief of Staff Ridgway and his staff determined that helicopters 
would have to provide transportation, evacuation, supply, and communications – all roles 
the helicopter filled in Vietnam. 
 Interservice Rivalry  
 The Army‘s desire to expand their aircraft inventory soon ran them afoul of the 
Air Force, however. This was the result of a crisis of identity between the two branches. 
As political scientist Frederic Bergerson explains, the Air Force wished to protect their 
role as the dominant practitioners of flight in the U.S. military. The Army existed as the 
―defender of the terrain,‖ and as Bergerson argues, ―their style reflected the vicissitudes 
of natural forces – cautious, slow, close to the ground.‖
17
 Conversely, the USAF role was 
as defenders of the air, and in ―such an ethereal atmosphere, it is not surprising that these 
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men clung tenaciously to the tangible air vehicles which took them and their identity 
aloft.‖
18
 Leaving aside the metaphysical, though, the very real purpose of the Air Force‘s 
aversion towards an expanded Army air capability is that they felt it encroached upon 
their function – if it flew it should belong to the Air Force. An agreement existed, though, 
originating from the National Security Act of 1947 which in part created the USAF, 
allowing the Army to possess organic aircraft. Despite such an accommodation, there 
were limitations to expansion. The Key West Agreement of 1948 between the Navy, 
Army, and the fledgling Air Force permitted the Army to retain limited aviation 
capabilities, but made no allowances for aircraft employed tactically as planners came to 
envision their role. Instead, the Air Force was to ―furnish close combat and logistical air 
support to the Army,‖ which included air lift, support, reconnaissance, and resupply 
operations – all functions the Army eventually sought to handle themselves.
19
 Likewise, 
the 20 May 1949 Bradley-Vandenberg Agreement intended to arrest further the numbers 
of aircraft by instituting weight restrictions on Army helicopters.
20
  
 Both branches acquiesced regarding further conditions in a 1950 agreement, 
stipulating the USAF would solely develop, supply, and conduct maintenance on Army 
aircraft.
21
 In a bid to guarantee weakened Army Aviation, the Air Force attempted to 
usurp their usefulness by proposing their own assault helicopter squadrons.
22
 Air Force 
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obstructions throughout the 1950s and well into the 1960s did slow advances in Army 
airmobility, but Air Staff members understood that to continue their preclusions and 
simultaneously maintain their future ambitions required a trade-off. Ultimately, as a 
means to maintain their primary role in massive retaliation, plans for their own assault 
helicopter squadrons lost out to the high-technology appeal of strategic nuclear 
delivery.
23
 
 During this era the Army lacked a single policy regarding the development of 
helicopter doctrine, resulting in multiple studies which acted independently without 
assisting or informing each other. The latter 1950s, however, witnessed a more focused 
attempt at establishing a singular program.
24
 The creation of a helicopter force was aided 
by the growing realization among policy makers that although nuclear war remained a 
distinct possibility and still prevailed as the central focus of American foreign policy, 
limited war was a growing potentiality.
25
 The 1958 Lebanon intervention and the 
Quemoy crisis indicated that massive retaliation offered few alternatives to total war, no 
matter the insignificance of the provocation.
26
 Reorganization among the Army occurred 
in 1961 to reflect this understanding.
27
 Under the new framework, division aviation assets 
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grew from company-size to battalion, a structure which the Army carried into Vietnam. 
As historian Christopher Cheng notes, however, while ―these new developments in Army 
aviation were significant, it was still a relatively evolutionary step . . . [the] 
reorganization did not create any major air mobile force.‖
28
 Even though the numbers of 
helicopters grew, for the most part units acted autonomously, without any official dictates 
of how they fit into a programmed combat structure. It took American intervention in 
Southeast Asia before airmobility took that next crucial step.    
 Rotors over Vietnam    
 The first U.S. helicopters arrived in Vietnam aboard the USNS Core on 11 
December 1961.
29
 The 57
th
 Transportation Company (Light Helicopter) and the 8
th
 
Transportation Company (Light Helicopter) participated in the earliest airmobile 
operation of the war on 2 January 1962 when Army CH-21 Shawnees successfully 
airlifted 1,000 Republic of Vietnam (RVN) paratroopers against a Viet Cong 
headquarters near Saigon.
30
 Codenamed ―Operation Chopper,‖ it signified the first phase 
of airmobile operations and the start of a decade-long proving ground for Army Aviation.  
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 According to General Maxwell D. Taylor, Military Adviser to President Kennedy, 
Vietnam was a suitable location for helicopters to operate. A lack of passable roads for 
ground mobile units or adequate communication lines hindered the RVN government‘s 
ability to fight communist incursions into the hinterland. U.S. aircraft promised to give 
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) quick response to the enemy‘s guerilla 
operations and to expand governmental control in the provinces. Furthermore, helicopters 
offered a degree of safety – they could overfly much of what was becoming dangerous 
territory, since ground routes were often susceptible not only to ambushes, but mines. 
Initially, thirty-two CH-21 Shawnees from the 57
th
 and the 8
th
 operated out of Tan Son 
Nhut Air Base near Saigon.
31
 Three more companies augmented them that year: the 33
rd
, 
81
st
, and 93
rd
 of the 45
th
 Transportation Battalion. In an illustration of America‘s level of 
commitment at this early stage, the 130 aircraft comprised almost twenty percent of the 
Army‘s available inventory.
32
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ARVN paratroopers board CH-21 Shawnees 
33
 
Early Problems 
 This period, however, was fraught with multiple problems. First, the relatively 
limited number of aircraft and pilots meant they were not able to experiment much 
beyond the normal demands of missions.
34
 Opportunities for gaining experience were 
limited to when the ARVN needed support, but even then command problems limited 
flexibility. American involvement was still technically an advisory effort. Transportation 
companies operated on a single-mission basis, attached to U.S. advisers who controlled 
mission planning and coordination. These advisers, however, had finite authority. Given 
their limited role they could not necessarily order the South Vietnamese to operate in a 
particular way, but merely suggest the best course of action.  
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 Early missions were often uncoordinated efforts between aviators and those they 
supported, depriving helicopter units of control.
35
 Crews found that unclear command 
relationships required alterations in command and control, communications, and fire 
support methods. Concern over this policy was not confined to pilots and crews but those 
in the United States questioned it, too. Retired Army Brigadier General Carl Hutton, 
himself an early helicopter proponent and former Commandant of the Army Aviation 
School, expressed hesitation, saying ―The divided command in Vietnam doubly weakens 
the tactics. In spite of the superb skill and steadfast courage of the helicopter personnel, 
the method of employment almost assures ultimate failure of national policy.‖
36
 
 Compounding matters, transportation companies experienced problems with their 
equipment. From the start there were precious few CH-21s available and replacement 
parts were considerably difficult to obtain, a fact exacerbated by insufficient logistical 
support.
37
 The Shawnee itself was sometimes problematic in the face of enemy fire, often 
proving too slow, too lightly armed, and too thin-skinned.
38
 Technological innovations 
had not kept pace with modern requirements, as the issue of antiquated equipment was 
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emblematic of an army in transition. The Bell UH-1 Iroquois ―Huey‖, the most 
recognizable helicopter of the war, began testing in 1956 but did not arrive in Vietnam 
until September 1962.
39
 When it did begin operations, lack of performance forced 
technical revisions, leading to the replacement of the original HU-1A with the UH-1B-
model by June 1963. Its stronger power plant was better suited for the high humidity, 
altitude density, and demanding operations.
40
 The Army was preparing to replace their 
aging aircraft, but the next generation of turbine-powered helicopters lingered stateside in 
the comprehensive testing phase.
41
   
 Obsolescent Shawnees were cause for concern amongst many who flew them. 
Noted New York Times journalist, David Halberstam, reported that most were ―in 
desperate need of repairs and that the difficult and demanding combat conditions in 
Vietnam‖ caused immense mechanical issues.
42
 ―The H-21 here,‖ warned one pilot, ―is 
an accident looking for a place to happen.‖
43
 Simply put, the first year of operations 
coincided with a transition period where better aircraft in the development stage since the 
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late 1950s were not yet available in appreciable numbers for combat. Despite these 
issues, Army Aviation still made progress improving airmobile doctrine. In less than a 
year of operating in RVN, as one correspondent saw it, they had learned ―more 
substantial information upon their new ‗air-assault‘ concept than had been gathered in 
years of earlier theorizing.‖
44
  
 The helicopter companies in-country were indeed learning valuable lessons which 
only combat could provide, and much of what they gathered was the product of continued 
trial and error. Soon after operations began, crews quickly realized deficiencies in their 
standard operating procedures. Peacetime formations were often ill-suited for the combat 
theater. As one former pilot noted, they ―looked nice and displayed our superior skills, 
but reduced the scope of defensive fire and did not place the troops on the ground in 
optimum arrangements for attack or defense.‖
45
 Just as problematic were flight altitudes 
customarily used stateside, which most times exposed flights needlessly to enemy fire. 
Most of what these first helicopter units developed were aggressive tactics far removed 
from earlier methods.
46
 Commenting on the casualties in men and machine by early 1963, 
an unnamed ―high-ranking military spokesman‖ remarked, ―Remember, this kind of 
warfare is brand new. We have to do some experimenting and we‘re bound to make 
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mistakes. But let‘s not forget how much helicopters have accomplished here.‖
47
 Vietnam 
quickly took on the character for which it became known. As one CH-21 crewmember 
observed, the Army‘s struggle was ―mainly a helicopter war. The helicopters are the 
front-line weapon.‖
48
  
 Through the experience of assisting ARVN forces, helicopter units drew lessons 
which proved invaluable not only to future operations in Vietnam, but to airmobility 
planners in the United States. Yet, to date Army Aviation was still engaged in a new type 
of warfare without official guidelines for operational planning and execution. Their 
tactics and procedures were largely ad hoc and not reflective of a sophisticated combined 
arms effort. Though their accomplishments are important, parallel developments in the 
United States during the same time proved to have more impactful consequences on the 
future of airmobility.  
Stateside Developments 
 While helicopter units flew daily operations in Vietnam, Army officials in the 
United States continued planning for a larger airmobile force. Throughout the early 
1960s, they began a series of reviews and boards to determine not only the future needs 
of aviation units, but how they would fight. The first official committee which studied the 
requirements was the Army Aircraft Requirements Review Board. Chaired by Lieutenant 
General Gordon B. Rogers, the deputy commanding general of the Continental Army 
Command, the Rogers Board reviewed potential aircraft with future combat needs in 
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mind.
49
 Beginning on 15 January 1960 it analyzed 119 designs from forty five separate 
companies, categorizing them into transport, observation, and surveillance. Among the 
notable recommendations was that the Army replace ―each model of aircraft at least 
every ten years or sooner if warranted by operational requirements or technological 
advances,‖ and that they ―prepare an in-depth study to determine whether the concept of 
air assault units was practical and if an experimental unit should be activated to test its 
feasibility.‖
50
 Though the Rogers Board did indicate progress in the Army‘s evolving use 
of helicopters, it was only a precursor of the tests to follow.    
 In an April 1962 memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of 
Defense Robert S. McNamara outlined his tacit support of helicopters, noting ―It appears 
to me that air vehicles, operating in the environment of the ground solider but freed from 
the restrictions imposed by the earth‘s surface, may offer the opportunity to acquire 
quantum increases in mobility, provided technology, doctrine, and organization potentials 
are fully exploited.‖
51
 In other correspondence he argued that the success of tests ―already 
made by the Army of airmobile divisions and their subordinate airmobile units . . . 
indicate the type of doctrinal concepts which could be evolved . . . .‖
52
 The Kennedy 
administration‘s support encouraged atypical perspectives on future warfare. In the 
secretary‘s opinion, he believed ―that the Army‘s re-examination of its aviation 
                                                 
49
 Olinger, ―Conceptual Underpinnings of The Air Assault Concept: The Hogaboom, Rogers and Howze 
Boards,‖ 5; Tolson, Airmobility, 8-10; Cheng, Air Mobility, 93, 94, 137, 38, 181, 206, 207. For information 
about the purpose and deliberations of the Rogers Board from a board member, see Lieutenant Colonel 
John W. Oswalt, ―Report on the ‗Rogers‘ Board,‖ USAAD, Vol. 7, No. 2 (February 1961), 15-17.  
50
 Olinger, ―Conceptual Underpinnings of the Air Assault Concept,‖ 5.  
51
  Robert S. McNamara, ―Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army,‖ 19 April 1962, Box 1, Folder 28, 
Hamilton H. Howze Papers, USAMHI.  
52
  Robert S. McNamara memorandum for Secretary of the Army Stahr, April 19, 1962 contained in Jacob 
A. Stockfisch, The 1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 
1994), 42.  
27 
 
 
 
requirements should be a bold ‗new look‘ at land warfare mobility. It should be 
conducted in an atmosphere divorced from traditional viewpoints and past policies.‖
53
 
McNamara‘s encouragement came with a warning, as he cautioned he would ―be 
disappointed if the Army‘s re-examination merely produces logistic-oriented 
recommendations to procure more of the same, rather than a plan for implementing fresh 
and perhaps unorthodox concepts which will give us a significant increase in mobility.‖
54
 
It was a license for Army Aviation to adopt the recommendations of its most ardent 
defenders of helicopters, while also a heavy burden – there would be only four months to 
gather personnel, devise and execute tests, and write a detailed report.
55
 Quickly, the 
Army formed a group to conduct the tests of airmobility, headed by Major General 
Hamilton H. Howze, the man hand-chosen by McNamara.
56
  
 The resultant committee, the Howze Board, was perhaps the single most 
important development of the 1960s in regards to establishing and suggesting the 
formation and operation of airmobile units.
57
 Howze took over as the chair, charged with 
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testing the organizational and operational concepts of airmobility. Thirteen generals, a 
handful of civilian researchers, and thirty staff officers fell under his direct command. 
Divided into seven separate working committees, each studied either reconnaissance, 
security, and target acquisition, tactical mobility, fire power, logistics operations and 
logistics support, operations research, and field testing.
58
 The Board wrote to active and 
retired officers, sending over 400 letters inquiring about their level of interest and 
suggestions for airmobility. The majority of the responses indicated a marked level of 
support for the concept, and the massive amount of correspondence served as an 
unofficial library of suggestions and ideas.
59
  
 Howze submitted the final report to McNamara in August 1962, which concluded 
that full adoption of the concept seemed prudent.
60
 In the Board‘s estimation airmobility 
was both ―necessary and desirable‖ – an inevitable evolution no different than the 
replacement of animal mobility by motor.
61
  Though the American commitment in 
Southeast Asia was increasing, the central focus of airmobility was not solely on its 
application in Vietnam. The final report outlined four potential enemy forces against 
which a proposed airmobile division could possibly fight and should thus be evaluated 
for such eventualities:  ―a modern enemy army (Warsaw Pact), an oriental army (Chinese 
Communist), an insurgency (Viet Cong) and other threats (Latin America, Africa, 
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etc.).‖
62
 These were still mostly theoretical distinctions, though. The Board provided the 
framework for an airmobile division, but McNamara demanded further testing to develop 
air assault techniques. For that, it required a special unit.   
The 11
th
 Air Assault Division and the 10
th
 Air Transport Brigade  
  The formation of the 11
th
 Air Assault Division (Test) at Fort Benning, Georgia 
might be the most significant recommendation of the Board – it certainly had the most 
far-reaching consequences.
63
 Activated 15 February 1963 from the 11
th
 Airborne 
Division, its commander, Brigadier General Harry W.O. Kinnard, received orders to 
―determine how far and how fast the Army can go, and should go, in embracing 
airmobility.‖
64
 More to the point, the 11
th
‘s purpose was ―to develop the details of 
doctrine, tactics and technique for its employment . . . [and] the chore of proving or 
disproving or modifying the organization prescribed by the [Howze] Board.‖
65
 Kinnard 
immediately allowed a free exchange of ideas, permitting his subordinate commanders to 
voice their opinions on tactical and operational theories and proposed developments. 
Unique to the test division was the ―Idea Center,‖ where ―any man, enlisted or officer, 
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could come in with an idea and where that idea would receive full evaluation.‖
66
 The 
spirit of the 11
th
 Air Assault Division (11
th
 AAD) was professional and the Idea Center 
illustrated their singularity of purpose: to push the limits of helicopters and how the Army 
used them. 
  As if those participating in the tests were not already aware of the impact their 
labors might have on the future of helicopter warfare, Colonel George P. ―Phip‖ Seneff, 
Jr., commander of the 11
th
 AAD‘s 11
th
 Aviation Group, attempted to make it apparent. 
Within weeks of the unit‘s formation Seneff wrote his men. ―You all have excellent 
backgrounds for your jobs,‖ he assured them, ―and you are chosen people. If you didn‘t 
have the backgrounds in the first place, you wouldn‘t be here….‖
67
 In Seneff‘s 
estimation, membership in the 11
th
 came with a large degree of responsibility, as ―the 
future of Army Aviation, and I think, a large part of the Army hangs on the outcome of 
our efforts.‖
68
 Their endeavors went beyond testing, but would act as the main 
determinant between either progress or a step back. ―If we are successful,‖ Seneff 
predicted, ―the Air Mobile concept will be a dynamic advance for the Army. If we are 
not, we will go back to flying Piper Cubs, if we have that much left, and the Army and 
the country as a whole will lose one of the things that . . . can mean the difference 
between victory and defeat in future land combat.‖
69
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 That is not to say everyone believed air assault was inevitable or that it was only a 
matter of time before its full implementation. Army Chief of Staff General Earle G. 
Wheeler stated in 1963 that ―we expect the 11
th
 Air Assault test program . . . to be a fair, 
unbiased, thoroughly professional examination of concepts, organization, and equipment 
that appear to offer very great promise for increasing our Army‘s combat 
effectiveness.‖
70
 Kinnard asserted that he did not approach the testing believing that 
airmobility would fulfill a preordained outcome. His job as the 11
th
 AAD‘s commander 
was not to ―write success or failure on the 11
th
 as it was given to me,‖ but instead to 
―nurture and develop it – to come up with the best improvement on the Howze Board that 
we could, given the resources and the time available.‖
71
 In later reflection, Lieutenant 
General Robert E. Coffin, the Chief of Staff of the Air Assault testing, argued the tests 
were objective and not all participants were certain airmobility would succeed. Instead, 
they approached their tasks convinced that ―air assault was going to have to prove itself,‖ 
rather than merely confirming a supposed certainty.
72
  
 Much of the doctrine with which the division experimented was directly related to 
what aviators in Southeast Asia were learning on a daily basis: flying in formation, aerial 
and artillery support in the multiple phases of air assaults, as well as the efficient 
movement of men and supplies throughout the battlefield areas. By October 1962 the 
Army had produced the first document to examine operational experiences of aviation 
units in Vietnam, distributing it widely for commanders and staff officers to allow for 
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doctrinal progression.
73
 That connection with the combat theater continued as the 11
th
 
maintained contact with units already in-country, and from across an ocean 
communicated between them many of their respective procedures and techniques. 
Helping this flow of ideas were pilots who returned from tours in Vietnam and arrived at 
Fort Benning to relate their experiences.
74
  
 The 11
th
 spent the remainder of 1963 and into 1964 testing new equipment, 
experimenting with maneuvers and organizations, executing simulated operations, and all 
the while slowly gaining aircraft and personnel. The culminating field exercise was the 
October 1964 Air Assault II, which ranged across four million acres in North and South 
Carolina.
75
 The 82
nd
 Airborne, augmented by two mechanized battalions of the 2
nd
 
Infantry Division, acted as the opposing force, simulating both guerilla and conventional 
forces. The 11
th
‘s command of the battlefield impressed most, as their increased mobility 
freed them of the usual hampering effects of rough terrain.
76
 At the close of testing the 
neutral test director, Fort Benning‘s Post Commander, Lieutenant General C.W.G. Rich, 
submitted his glowing recommendation to Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. 
Johnson, claiming that an air assault division constituted ―the most versatile forces that 
we can add to the United States Army.‖
77
 Despite the mostly positive recommendations 
of those involved with the tests, McNamara did not immediately approve the activation of 
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an airmobile division. The worsening situation in Vietnam, however, acted as a 
substantial catalyst. 
 As historian John Carland notes, the ARVN‘s quickly eroding ability to contain 
the insurgency provided an impetus for the Department of Defense to accept an airmobile 
division in the Army‘s organization structure.
78
 By early 1965 the Army had to decide 
which unit would operate in northern RVN with its rugged terrain and the important 
provincial capital of Pleiku. Reliance on ordinary infantry units seemed dubious given 
their time-intensive movements and general over-dependence on vehicles. Following 
such rigorous testing, and eager to prove themselves in battle, the 11
th
 Air Assault 
Division seemed a suitable fit.
 79
 After a dedicated effort to determine how effective the 
new concept could be, those associated with the tests were anxious to implement it, 
impatient to ―flex its muscles . . . eager to show off airmobility and make officials 
wonder how they ever got along without it.‖
80
 
 Despite favorable recommendations to implement the airmobile division, Kinnard 
was apprehensive that their efforts in the 11
th
 AAD were for naught. He noted that ―It 
was my overall impression [the airmobile division] was hanging by a thread, and I was 
very worried about it.‖
81
 It was Vietnam, though, in Kinnard‘s later reflections, which 
convinced the command structure to implement an airmobile division. ―I think it was a 
very tight time,‖ he mentioned, and ―I would have to speculate that if there had been no 
decision to send a division to Vietnam – an Army division—that we probably would have 
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been broken up and probably there would not have been an airmobile or an air assault 
division.‖
82
 Kinnard‘s speculations are likely correct. Throughout the testing phase the 
United States inched closer to outright war, and that eventuality helped keep the air 
assault division alive.  
 The Tonkin Gulf incident in early August 1964 involving two U.S. destroyers, the 
Maddox and Turner Joy, provided President Lyndon Johnson with a growing conviction 
that the situation demanded an enhanced American military presence.
83
 From late 1964 
into mid-1965 American troops in Vietnam grew from fifty thousand to ninety thousand. 
Meanwhile, the moribund RVN government struggled against the communist insurgency. 
Into this climate of growing uncertainty and continued instability the airmobility concept 
evolved from a testable theory to reality. Southeast Asia was soon to be its proving 
ground, as the Central Highlands and the provincial capitals of Kontum and Pleiku 
continued to be a high profile target for the Viet Cong. Secretary McNamara accepted the 
proposal to create an airmobile division on 19 April 1965. It took until 15 June, though, 
before he formally approved the decision to activate the 11
th
, reflagging the unit as the 1
st
 
Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
84
 President Johnson announced in July that he was sending 
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one hundred thousand more U.S. troops to South Vietnam, specifically naming the 1
st
 
Cav as the first to deploy – Vietnam had birthed the airmobile division. 
 In order to fill the ranks, pilots from all over the Army received orders to Fort 
Benning.
85
 The new unit had only eight weeks to become combat-ready. Recently arrived 
aviators received training from 11
th
 AAD veterans to impart upon them the new tactical 
concepts and procedures the testing unit had devised.
86
 Fresh from the Army‘s rotary-
wing aviation school, Robert Mason experienced the capabilities of 11
th
 AAD‘s pilots. 
Compared to his training during flight school where ―our formations could be defined as 
two or more helicopters flying within sight of each other in the same sky‖ the close 
formations employed by the ―old salts‖ demanded far more aptitude. To squeeze a flight 
of Hueys into small landing zones ―required that they fly, land, and take off very close 
together.‖
87
 To be sure, most of the former members of the 11
th
 maintained an extreme 
level of proficiency, exemplifying their status as fearless wild men. Their flying fit the 
model, too, as Mason asserts, ―These guys were cowboys.‖
88
  
 Despite attempts to acclimate new pilots to the distinct methods of flying, there 
would not be enough time to fully prepare. As Mason notes, ―I saw these techniques – the 
low-level, the close formations – performed much more often than I did them. We had 
very little time. The new pilots would be getting their Huey experience and air-assault 
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training on the job in Vietnam.‖
89
 Indeed, veteran of the 11
th
 Air Assault Division or not, 
most all were equally inexperienced in the real application of airmobility in a theater of 
war, though that day fast approached. Kinnard left for Southeast Asia on 16 August to 
meet with the overall commander of the American effort there, General William C. 
Westmoreland of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV).
90
 How the 1
st
 
Cavalry would fare in combat, however, remained to be seen. 
The Guns of November: The Pleiku Campaign and Airmobility 
 The first group to represent the 1
st
 Cavalry, the Advance Liaison Detachment, left 
the continental U.S. on 2 August 1965. Illustrating the intimate relation between aviation 
and the airmobile unit, twenty eight of the ―key officers and men‖ were pilots. The 
majority were executive officers ordered to liaise with aviation units already in Vietnam, 
learning aspects of operating in the unique terrain and weather conditions they would 
encounter in their area of operations.
91
 Upon meeting with the initial group two miles 
north of the village of An Khe, thirty six miles inland, they began construction of the 1
st
 
Cavalry‘s new home, effectively in the middle of Viet Cong-controlled territory.
92
  
 The 1
st
 Cavalry Division‘s arrival in Vietnam marks the second phase of 
airmobile operations in Southeast Asia. With more assets and a dedicated division of 
soldiers trained for the new type of combat, it did not take long for the Americans to 
baptize in fire their refined concept. North Vietnamese forces attacked the small, 
triangular-shaped Special Forces compound at Plei Me near the Cambodian border on 19 
                                                 
89
  Ibid.   
90
  Stanton, The 1
st
 Cav in Vietnam, 39.  
91
  1
st
 Cav Interim Report of Operations, July 1, 1965-December 31, 1966, 3; Kinnard Interview, Senior 
Officers Oral History Program, USAMHI, 94.  
92
  Ibid.; Stanton, The 1
st
 Cav in Vietnam, 40; Mason, Chickenhawk, 64.    
37 
 
 
 
October, signaling phase one of the larger Pleiku Campaign/Operation Silver Bayonet. 
An assault on such a remote outpost was not a peculiar incident for the period. It differed 
from other attacks not only because of the noticeable ferocity with which they struck, but 
the fact it was so well planned and executed. Indeed, the attackers were not the customary 
local Viet Cong soldiers – farmers by day and militia by night – but a regiment of well-
prepared and equipped North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regulars hoping to lure and 
ambush any relief element.
93
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 The fierceness of the assault worried Westmoreland. It appeared the NVA would 
strike other important locations, like the provincial capital of Pleiku City. Worse yet, they 
might cut South Vietnam in two.
95
 It soon became evident that Plei Me was the start of a 
concerted enemy effort to gain control of the whole Central Highlands.
96
 When 
Westmoreland arrived on 26 September the situation remained worrisome. Intelligence 
suggested a portion of the NVA forces were regrouping west of Plei Me in a 2,500 square 
kilometer region of rolling terrain punctuated by elephant grass and wooded areas.
97
 
Airmobile units appeared best suited to engage the enemy in the largely road-less area, 
especially against such a conventionally equipped and trained main force opponent. 
Westmoreland‘s orders were simple: ―Find, fix and destroy the enemy forces threatening 
Plei Me, Pleiku, and the Central Highlands.‖
98
 
Sturm and Ia Drang 
 American forces caught up with the North Vietnamese in the Ia Drang Valley, 
approximately six miles from the Cambodian border.
99
 In the shadow of the Chu Pong 
massif, 11
th
 Air Assault veteran Colonel Harold G. Moore and his 1
st
 Battalion, 7
th
 
Cavalry Regiment (1/7), 1
st
 Cavalry Division, air assaulted, setting the stage for the first 
large-scale meeting of U.S. and NVA forces. Earlier in the day of 14 November, Moore 
executed a reconnaissance flight to locate prospective landing zones. Employing tactical 
                                                 
95
  Stanton, The 1
st
 Cavalry in Vietnam, 50; General William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New 
York: Da Capo Press, 1989), 156; Tolson, Airmobility, 73.   
96
  This idea was key to the American‘s dedicated defense of Plei Me, Pleiku, and the surrounding areas. As 
the eventual Operations Report mentions, ―To control PLEIKU is to control the highlands.‖ Operations 
Report: Lessons Learned, Report 3-66 – The PLEIKU Campaign, 10 May 1966, 213. Hereafter cited as 
OR-LL – Pleiku Campaign. 
97
  Moore & Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once, 54; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 157.  
98
  As quoted in Galvin, Air Assault, 292; Lieutenant General John H. Hay, Jr. Tactical and Material 
Innovations, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1989), 12.   
99
  Colonel Michael J. Krisman, ―‗Can Do‘ Helicopter,‖ Army Digest, Vol. 21, No. 7 (July 1966), 12.        
39 
 
 
 
deception, he was careful to not directly overfly the area, lest they telegraph American 
intentions to any enemy observing from below – a technique which became standard 
throughout most of Vietnam.
100
 Instead, Moore had his flight of two lift ships and their 
two escorting gunships fly a straight line towards Duc Co Special Forces camp, well 
southeast of the Chu Pong and at an altitude of 4,500 feet. After reviewing three possible 
landing zones, Moore and his subordinates agreed upon one, code-named Landing Zone 
(LZ) X-Ray.
101
   
 As the sixteen Hueys of the 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion (AHB) formed up 
and prepared to insert the first lift into X-Ray they exercised the tactics of a typical 
combat assault as dictated by the Army‘s previous experience in Vietnam and the 11
th
 Air 
Assault‘s testing. Moore arranged for preparatory artillery fires on the landing zone to 
begin twenty minutes before their scheduled arrival.
102
 The flight maintained an altitude 
of 2,000 feet to stay outside the effective range of small arms fire, as they were crossing 
almost fifteen miles of countryside controlled entirely by the enemy. The 14.3 miles 
between where the rest of the battalion staged at Plei Me for insertion into the Ia Drang 
meant a lengthy round-trip and multiple lifts. 
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  The first three flights of ―slicks‖ landed in LZ X-Ray, attaining surprise, but as 
the third lift departed the enemy began to pour down the Chu Pong and attack the landing 
zone.
103
 Stiff resistance meant the 229
th
‘s pilots could not deliver all of the unit‘s 
remaining troops. Facing a difficult situation and dwindling supplies, without the 
helicopter support it is doubtful the besieged 1
st
 Battalion could have fought on, as they 
found themselves immediately surrounded by an opposing force many times their size, 
equaling at least a regiment.
104
 Understanding the importance of the landing zone, 
Colonel Moore directed his troopers to protect it at all costs. ―That football-field-size 
clearing,‖ Moore later wrote,‖ was our lifeline and our supply line. If the enemy closed 
the way to the helicopters all of us would die in this place.‖
105
 Throughout the 
engagement the 229
th
 flew crucial medical evacuation and resupply missions into X-Ray, 
―in most cases at grave risk to pilots and crew.‖
106
 By 16 November, two days after 
fighting began, Hal Moore‘s battalion received orders to withdraw from the area while 
elements of the 2
nd
 Battalion, 7
th
 Cavalry and 2
nd
 Battalion, 5
th
 Cavalry would take 
over.
107
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 The assault helicopter pilots did not necessarily exhibit any groundbreaking 
tactics unique to the Ia Drang Valley battle; they merely exercised the techniques 
practiced and drilled repeatedly during the testing phase and subsequent training periods 
in the continental U.S.
108
 What is significant, though, is that for the first time they 
supported American soldiers from start to finish against main-force North Vietnamese 
regulars in what was the largest and bloodiest engagement of the war to date. The 1
st
 
Cavalry took full advantage of their aviation assets. UH-1s carried them into battle, CH-
47s relocated supporting artillery batteries numerous times, scout helicopters acted as the 
eyes of the larger unit, command and control ships (C&C) coordinated the battle from the 
air, while gunship and aerial rocket artillery (ARA) helicopters offered close air 
support.
109
  
 The battle was a victory, but not a resounding one for the Americans in a 
conventional sense. Certainly their ground troops could claim success in that they 
pursued their enemy, won the battlefield and forced a heavy toll in men and equipment, 
but the cost in American lives was nonetheless shocking.
110
 For the most part, though, the 
Americans were victorious – the 1
st
 Cavalry‘s intention was to find, fix, and destroy the 
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enemy, not gain and hold terrain. While success in the Ia Drang can be measured in a 
comparative body count and the fact the enemy retreated back across the border into 
Cambodia, the ultimate gauge of triumph for most in the Army was how the 1
st
 Cavalry 
transformed the theoretical into conceptual reality. Strategically, the larger Pleiku 
Campaign upset NVA aims in the Central Highlands. 
  In a larger sense, though, it proved the effectiveness of large-scale airmobile 
efforts and the invaluable mobility of helicopters. Plei Me and the resultant battle at Ia 
Drang were what the operations report termed ―airmobility‘s acid test,‖ which revealed 
―whether three years of planning and testing would bear the fruits of victory – for a 
concept and a division.‖
111
 To Westmoreland, the substantiation of heli-borne warfare 
was notable in the absence of battlefield errors which had accompanied other first-actions 
in the American military record. He admitted that although a single U.S. casualty was 
lamentable, he ―could take comfort in the fact that in the Highlands . . . the American 
fighting man and his commanders had performed without the setbacks that have 
sometimes marked first performance in other wars.‖
112
 Indeed, Ia Drang avoided the 
devastating initial engagement stumble of the Kasserine Pass or Pusan Perimeter. For 
those expecting a promising debut for American troops in South Vietnam, the Pleiku 
Campaign seemed to offer it.  
 Perhaps the professionalism which the 1
st
 Cavalry‘s helicopter battalions 
exhibited during their first large combat action is not surprising. The pilots did not arrive 
in Vietnam completely unprepared. Rigorous stateside training by the 11
th
 Air Assault 
had at least prepared most with an in-depth knowledge of the mechanics of air assaults. 
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Chief Warrant Officer Leland C. Komich credits his time in the 11
th
 with helping him 
cope with the initial shock of combat. ―The training carried over to Vietnam very nicely,‖ 
he remembered. ―The first time I was in a ‗hot‘ landing zone, I heard everybody shooting 
but thought, ‗Jeez, that‘s the same sound you get in training with blanks.‘‖
113
 In his after-
action report, Colonel Moore professed his opinion of Army aviators during Ia Drang and 
maintained he had ―the highest admiration, praise and respect for the outstanding 
professionalism and courage of the UH-1D pilots and crews who ran a gauntlet of enemy 
fire time after time to help us. They never refused to come in; they followed instructions 
beautifully; they were great.‖
114
 Indeed, the tactics and procedures learned earlier in the 
war and refined during the tests in the American south had prepared the pilots and 
commanders well.  
 Secretary of Defense McNamara visited the 1
st
 Cavalry at An Khe soon after the 
completion of the campaign and stated that the effort was an ―unparalleled achievement,‖ 
and promised that there would be ―more air cavalry divisions.‖
115
 It was a statement 
intended to praise the 1
st
 Cavalry for an impressive first engagement, perhaps indicative 
of the relief he felt in that the concept actually worked, but his approbation did not reflect 
the eventuality.
116
 Westmoreland also expressed relief at the engagement‘s outcome, 
reporting that he had reservations about sending the unproven 1
st
 Cavalry into 
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―inhospitable terrain‖ and did so ―not without considerable anguish‖ – failure ―in our first 
big test‖ would surely ―have sharp repercussions on our self-confidence and morale and 
on the American people.‖
117
 For individuals so invested in airmobility‘s success, the 
results of the Pleiku Campaign and Ia Drang mollified anxieties. The collective vision of 
a more mobile force was not a dangerous gamble after all, but an effective reality. 
Conclusion 
  
 Over the course of a quick fifteen years, Army combat helicopter units evolved 
from a small contingent into a formidable force. With the foresight of a handful of 
visionaries, helicopters became not only the prime mover of U.S. men and material 
throughout Southeast Asia, but an invaluable component of an entire strategy. Though 
explicitly intended for a European battlefield, wartime necessities meant airmobility 
would find its true test in very different terrain against a very different enemy. Despite 
there being some indication, especially in the early 1960s, that the United States might 
soon face the challenge of brush-fire wars throughout the world, it did not necessarily 
alter the Army‘s overall approach. Airmobility was not designed for Vietnam 
specifically, but for a worldwide structure which stressed employment in Europe as the 
most likely battlefield. So long as they provided mobility to their ground units, the Army 
believed, they could meet any contingency in the world with a single organizational 
structure.
118
  
 Since Vietnam seemed to require enhanced mobility it made sense helicopters met 
their first tests in late 1961. For the Army, combating an insurgency with a new doctrine 
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meant that, as historian Christopher Cheng posits, ―battlefield needs ultimately affected 
the direction of air mobility development.‖
119
 If not for the initial years when under-
supported units flying antiquated aircraft yielded impressive results, it is hard to imagine 
Vietnam earning the eventual moniker of ―the helicopter war.‖ Recognition of just how 
much combat the first units witnessed is not sufficiently appreciated in the historical 
record.
120
 U.S. attempts to insist their presence was limited to advising has, perhaps, 
caused an illusion that Army forces gained little knowledge of combat operations during 
those formative years. To claim that it was simply an advisory effort with little actual 
contact is to undervalue the era – even at the early stage it was a hot war, to be sure.  
 Despite their experiences, though, airmobility was not set in stone. The Howze 
Board and the stateside tests throughout 1963 and 1964 by the 11
th
 Air Assault Division 
are often identified by scholars as the largest arbiter of airmobile tactics during the 1960s. 
Though those actions certainly built the framework for how assault helicopters would be 
utilized by the Army in Vietnam, they existed in the theoretical, untested in actual 
combat. In the words of George Seneff, ―It was an exciting time, the 11
th
 brought things a 
long way. Vietnam brought them a lot further.‖
121
 The 1
st
 Cavalry Division proved the 
concept was valid, but units still had much to learn about the employment of helicopters. 
 Following victory in the Ia Drang, the tactical realities of some units changed. 
The mission of the 1
st
 Cavalry and helicopter units as a whole went from one of 
reinforcement and reaction to one which permitted an almost endless and unlimited 
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offensive.
122
 In the next few years American ground commanders utilized this capability, 
depending on it to support a burgeoning strategy of attrition. Battlefield successes 
signified maturation of the air assault concept and for most erased the belief the 
helicopter‘s role lay mainly with the movement of equipment. Indeed, the concept was 
proven effectual and worth further refinement. Pleiku may have been airmobility‘s first 
test in large-scale combat, but it was far from the last. Throughout the remainder of 
Vietnam, the Army continued to refine what Pleiku initially taught them: that the concept 
was sound but far from infallible. Tactical revelations might have lauded the Pleiku 
Campaign/Operation Silver Bayonet as the guarantor of helicopter assaults‘ battlefield 
primacy, but the Army‘s desire to refine the concept assured it was only the beginning. 
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CHAPTER TWO: INNOVATION THROUGH COMBAT EXPERIENCE 
 Throughout the remainder of the American involvement in Southeast Asia, 
multiple factors affected how the Army refined their helicopter techniques and 
procedures. There were four which noticeably influenced these doctrinal developments. 
First was the character of the Vietnam War itself. Despite previous testing which 
emphasized operating in a European conflict, the Army adapted helicopters as a 
counterinsurgency tool. That shift required alterations in procedures, tactics, training, and 
organization. Second, their employment on such a large scale required the Army to come 
to terms with such prevalent usage. Both the aviation and infantry communities learned to 
interact with one another, and helicopter crews discovered they had to ―educate‖ some 
among the ground forces about aircraft, crew, or mission limitations. The third factor was 
that the Army discovered that standardization of tactics and techniques across all of 
South Vietnam was, although desirable on an organizational level, ultimately not feasible. 
Geography, mission, and standard procedures among the supported ground units dictated 
much of their techniques and methods. Finally, the enemy‘s ability to revise their own 
methods required commensurate responses from assault helicopter units. Overall, 
between 1966 and 1971 assault helicopters continued a vibrant era of innovation in 
tactics, procedures, and mission.   
1966: Coming of Age 
 One of the most significant factors to affect Army Aviation doctrine after 1965 
was the character of the war. The U.S. military‘s overall strategy of attrition largely 
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dictated how helicopter units operated. Additionally, the Americans struggled to counter 
their opposition‘s reworked strategy, which was in part a direct response to the enhanced 
mobility of U.S. helicopters. Army Aviation faced the reality that in order to remain a 
viable resource they had to provide their assets in whatever way complemented the 
infantry. This was certainly apparent in the aftermath of the Pleiku Campaign. As U.S. 
and Communist forces solidified their strategies, the helicopter remained influential for 
both. Indeed, if Ia Drang provided the Army comfort in validating airmobility, it had an 
equally viable impact for the North Vietnamese Army.  
 Use of main force units signified an altered strategy for the NVA, as they moved 
from guerilla operations into a conventional military unit configuration.
123
 Ia Drang 
indicated to the North Vietnamese the structure of American operations. Infantry Colonel 
David H. Hackworth concludes well that as a result, "the North Vietnamese learned how 
to fight us. And looked at in this way, even if the battle was an unprecedented victory for 
the Americans in our war of attrition, it was an equally unprecedented victory for our 
enemy in their protracted guerrilla war.‖
124
 1966 was a transition year for both 
belligerents. As the Communists learned American strengths, U.S. forces took steps 
towards an offensive, building up the requisite amount of men and equipment to fight the 
aggressive war which General William Westmoreland envisioned. In his words it became 
a year of ―progressively developing our ability to fight an elusive enemy….a year of 
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learning: old tactics had to be modified, new tactics and techniques explored. We had to 
learn the enemy‘s tactics and how to deal with them….‖
125
 
 While the enemy still maintained their large conventional forces, they were 
careful to operate mostly in the safety of border areas, notable for their remoteness, and 
along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) or heavily forested and jungled regions. 
Westmoreland noted that throughout 1966 the NVA remained in isolated environs, 
unable to ―bring their weight to bear in the populated areas‖; a belief he substantiated 
with the fact that ―no main force unit . . . entered the populated area around Saigon‖ for 
over fifteen months.‖
126
 Realizing that open battle on anything but their own terms would 
lead to unsustainable casualties, communist forces remained elusive. By allowing their 
regular units to operate in the hinterland of Vietnam‘s western border, they hoped it 
would draw the Americans out of the peopled areas, permitting the insurgency to make 
gains in the more populated coastal regions.
127
  
 Frustrated by an increasingly evasive foe, the Army sought to engage them using 
the mobility of helicopters. Much like the Pleiku Campaign, a substantial impediment to 
American operations was rough terrain, mostly impassable using wheeled vehicles. 
Overcoming these difficulties required troop-carrying helicopters. Apparent success in 
late-1965 convinced the MACV staff in 1966 they now faced a weakened foe, and by 
conventional thinking it constituted the perfect time to capitalize on any hesitation the 
opposition offered.  
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  Westmoreland decided that large-scale offensive operations in South Vietnam 
were the best avenue to victory. It aligned well with his strategy of wearing down the 
enemy through high casualties. Doing so meant finding the opposition in remote areas of 
the country, only easily accessible by air. Helicopters, therefore, became an essential 
vehicle of the American strategy. Of the several strategic choices available, an offensive 
against North Vietnam proper could potentially bring an end to the war. That would 
likely conflict with the U.S. policy of containment, though, and some strategists feared it 
could provoke a possible intervention by Communist Chinese forces. Cross-border 
thrusts into the sanctuary zones of neutral Laos and Cambodia – areas which the NVA 
routinely utilized as bases of operations – were equally off-limits. To the politically-
minded American planners the best option available was focusing on the war in South 
Vietnam.
128
 
 Augmented by a powerful tactical air capability, artillery, and other machines of 
war, the helicopter became an indispensable tool during the offensives. From November 
1966 through May 1967, Westmoreland planned sustained operations, taking advantage 
of the dry season which offered preferable flying conditions in the southern regions.
129
 In 
this theater the helicopter and airmobility ―came of age.‖
130
 It ―balanced the odds‖ and 
created ―a dramatic new dimension which allowed the precise application of a variety of 
combat power.‖
131
 For the Army, increased reliance on the helicopter was a direct 
response to the opposition‘s own strategy. The true insurgency still existed, but it was in 
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fact taking secondary importance behind a growing desire for conventional warfare 
among North Vietnam‘s influential commanders. Ultimately, either side committed to a 
strategy of attrition. The North hoped to break American will on the battlefield through 
unacceptably high casualties, while the U.S. expected to use their firepower to convince 
the insurgents their efforts were futile.
132
  
Counterinsurgency?  
 Despite any changes in how the enemy operated, the Army continued to classify 
what they faced quite broadly as an insurgency. Debates continue among the military 
history community as to whether or not the U.S. attempt to fight a counterinsurgency 
with superior technology was folly; if they erroneously missed the opportunity to win 
Vietnamese hearts and minds by becoming slaves to high-tech components and 
conventional tactics. Observers such as Andrew Krepinevich assert that the Army 
essentially abandoned counterinsurgency in favor of their central strategy of attrition 
which relied upon impressive body count numbers and dazzling statistics.
133
 Historian 
John Nagl also posits that ―the U.S. Army‘s concept of how to fight and win [through 
superior firepower] precluded the development of a successful counterinsurgency 
doctrine in South Vietnam.‖
134
 Others argue that the Army set in concrete such a strategy 
before whole-sale American involvement in Southeast Asia began – airmobility planning 
superseded counterinsurgency in the early 1960s Army because many believed an 
increased reliance on helicopters obviated the need for true counterinsurgency doctrine.  
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 Still, infantry proponents of airmobility claimed that helicopters gave them the 
advantage of superior flexibility and speed necessary to outmaneuver and destroy 
guerrilla forces. The aversion that some infantry officers felt towards counterinsurgency 
likely had more to do with personal ambition – airmobility‘s command structure was 
better suited for promotions, appealing to the career-minded. Concurrently, most officers 
believed technological solutions (airmobility) were more alluring than doctrinal 
adjustments (counterinsurgency). Effectively, the Army ―sabotaged‖ preparations to fight 
an insurgency as they ―sought to mislead deliberately by creating the appearance of 
accepting the mission of counterinsurgency. It created manuals and training courses for 
counterinsurgency, and claimed to be highly interested. Thus, in practice, the Army‘s 
commitment was tantamount to a smokescreen.‖
135
 
  Hackworth corroborates this belief by drawing upon his experience in Infantry 
School at Fort Benning in 1962, alongside soldiers who would likely take commands in 
Vietnam. ―…the counterinsurgency training we were receiving wasn‘t counterinsurgency 
at all,‖ he argued, ―but conventional tactics with increased mobility provided by 
helicopters, or ‗choppers,‘ (As it was explained by one helicopter-enamored commander, 
with choppers ‗we can bring in fresh troops, hit fast, and in thirty seconds we can clean 
them out.‘)‖
136
 Not all soldiers allowed themselves to become so captivated by the 
technological appeal of helicopters. Instead, their solutions relied upon the fundamentals 
of war: ―‗We need new tactics,‘ the Special Forces pros pleaded, ‗for a protracted 
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guerrilla war‘…‖
137
 Despite such exhortations, Hackworth noticed little truly changed 
within the Army, that ―however many hours the Career Course devoted to the subject 
because the Kennedy Administration demanded it, from the Infantry School point of 
view, it was just a requirement, to be given a good load of lip service but little more. And 
that was what it got, regardless of what the soldiers and officers truly needed or what the 
war to come required.‖
138
   
 Though these comments reflect the attitude three years before pronounced 
American involvement in Vietnam, much of the Infantry School‘s enthusiasm about the 
helicopter reflected a prevalent assumption throughout the Army during the entire decade 
– that the aircraft would carry them into future wars, no matter their composition or 
objectives. Many of Hackworth‘s fellow officers in the school at the time would have 
likely completed tours in Southeast Asia, just as he did. They carried with them the 
training continually prevalent during the 1960s, instruction which stressed that infantry 
paired with helicopters offered a formidable combination anywhere in the world in any 
type of conflict. Taking these inclinations into account, it is not surprising the 1st 
Cavalry‘s initial combat experience presaged how American forces would fight in 
Vietnam. Ia Drang appeared to provide favorable results and seemed to convince 
effectively the Army Staff that airmobility worked. Firepower and mobility meant that 
the debate was over and that helicopters, tactical air support, and artillery replaced the 
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traditional means of fighting an insurgency – counterinsurgency had a new 
complexion.
139
   
 Bernard Fall, the foremost expert on the contemporary Western experience in 
Indochina, noticed this change in the U.S. approach to Vietnam.
140
 With the arrival of 
large units, ―Two types of warfare died in 1965-66 in Viet-Nam, in both the North and 
the South: Counterinsurgency was one of them, and the national war of liberation was the 
other. They were both killed by the sheer mass of American firepower thrown into the 
conflict.‖
141
 Fall observes that U.S. power, and helicopters by implication, could ―stave 
off just about any kind of military disaster,‖ which should have cost them dearly. In 
proving his point he used a recent example of blunder-turned-victory when ―a helicopter-
borne outfit of the 101
st
 Airborne erroneously put down in the midst of a VC assembly 
area a few days ago, the result should, under normal circumstances, have been 
unmitigated disaster.‖
142
 Rather, the event proved what he saw as typical American 
insulation from the normal fundamentals of war – that technology and enhanced mobility 
could rectify any military errors. Army representatives would likely delight in Fall‘s 
exasperating realization that ―Against this slaughter, the teachings of Mao Tse-tung, 
superior tactics, popular support for the VC, or conversely, poor motivation among the 
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Arvins [ARVNs] and patent ineptness among many of their officers, and even the ‗mess 
in Saigon‘ are totally irrelevant.‖
143
 For the Army, no matter the composition of the war – 
be it against a Warsaw Pact nation or an insurgency – helicopters and technology factored 
heavily into their concept of modern warfare. Whether their strategy constituted a true 
counterinsurgency or not, the Army operated under the belief the helicopter was an 
essential element of their Vietnam operations.  
 Ideas of American exceptionalism seemed to convince many among the military 
elite that their approaches would not likely produce a mirrored outcome of the failed 
French experience only a decade earlier. The U.S. Army‘s seeming dedication to a 
continued strategy of attrition ensured the helicopter would remain a central component 
of future operations. In the minds of the military planners of the day, attempts to find, fix, 
and destroy NVA and VC forces required a heli-mobile army. This was not something 
those among the aviation community necessarily bemoaned. Though Army Aviation may 
have seemed ―uncertain of its goals‖ during the 1950s, Vietnam provided a questionless 
function.
144
 An increasing reliance upon the helicopter gave them ample opportunities to 
revise and refine their combat procedures. By 1965 the 1
st
 Cavalry Division might have 
constituted the largest dedicated airmobile force ever organized to date, but the growing 
demand for helicopters meant Army Aviation would find their services more in-demand. 
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How the entire Army came to terms with such a considerable assault helicopter force, 
though, required continual patience, open-mindedness, and clear lines of communication.  
Meeting the Need: The 1
st
 Aviation Brigade 
 The second factor to impact developments in procedures and techniques was the 
formation of a new aviation brigade. The Vietnam-era army was essentially an airmobile 
force since the character of the war birthed a growing reliance on helicopters. Though 
most infantry divisions already had their own helicopter support in the form of an 
attached aviation battalion, the demands of Vietnam meant those small numbers became 
inadequate. Large combat assaults and sizeable operations proved that these units were 
stretched too thin. The Army looked to alleviate the pressure on these battalions while 
also supplying adequate numbers of helicopters, lest planned operations become 
impossible due to a lack of aircraft support. Their solution came in the form of aviation 
groups composed of multiple battalions. When the numbers of these independent groups 
grew, the Army formed an aviation brigade – the first aviation unit of that size – made 
out of whole cloth in May 1966.  
 Officially, the 1
st
 Cavalry was the only airmobile division until the 101
st
 
Airborne‘s reconfiguration. Indeed, few divisions or subordinate commands were 
airmobile, but all employed a degree of airmobility despite their lack of official 
configuration. Helicopter units fell into two categories: organic and non-organic. The 1
st
 
Cavalry enjoyed its own ―organic‖ aviation groups, meaning these helicopters belonged 
directly to the 1
st
 Cav, for their explicit use. Such command relationships were beneficial 
to an airmobile division so reliant upon helicopters as prime movers of men and 
equipment. Additionally, having organic air assets also precluded the necessity of 
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requisitioning helicopters from other commands. Infantry divisions not in an official 
airmobile configuration had organic helicopter units as well. They utilized their own 
aviation battalion – along with an air cavalry troop of observation and attack helicopters – 
while some smaller units came equipped with modest aviation sections to provide general 
support. 
  The 1
st
 Aviation Brigade fell under the second category, non-organic aviation – 
the only such unit in Vietnam. Their existence was based exclusively upon the 
overwhelming need for aircraft within Southeast Asia. Brigade helicopters supported 
various infantry units who either did not have their own aircraft or who needed extra help 
within their area of operation. Not belonging to an infantry command, their sole existence 
was to assist any ground forces in need of aviation support.
145
 With such a large 
helicopter force in-country, the opportunities to develop and implement new ideas across 
the entirety of South Vietnam grew exponentially.    
  Their formation was a ground-breaking moment for not only Army Aviation, but 
helicopter warfare in general. When U.S. offensive operations became more prevalent the 
Army faced the dilemma of increasing numbers of ground units who required aviation 
support.
146
 As stretched as these assets already were, the situation was complicated 
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because of the uncharted aspects of it – the aviation units had little prior experience 
supporting non-airmobile divisions and were ―not sure of the proper mix.‖
147
 A lack of 
Hueys and pilots necessitated a distribution of one assault helicopter company per 
brigade – a significantly disproportionate ratio compared to the 1
st
 Cavalry‘s support 
structure.
148
 Prior methods of lending the limited numbers of helicopters to other 
divisions had become too unwieldy and difficult to manage given the lack of centralized 
command. The Army ordered Brigadier General George P. ―Phip‖ Seneff, Jr. to form the 
aviation brigade to solve the problem. As an 11
th
 Air Assault Division veteran, he 
brought experience and an uncompromising vision of what he believed the airmobile 
potential to be. The mission was a daunting one: to offer non-organic Army aviation to 
those in need of it – to ―provide tactical mobility for combat troops, supplies, and 
equipment‖ – in a timely and effective manner.
149
 
 Not only was the 1
st
 responsible for assisting American infantry commands, but 
ARVN divisions and one Republic of Korea division expected U.S. helicopter assistance 
as well. They divided assets into different Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ).
150
 Three of the 
four CTZs had an aviation group which acted as a pool. Ground commands liaised with 
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their corps‘ aviation group to request helicopter assets as needed.
151
 As a result, ground 
troops received attached helicopters for a predetermined amount of time, tasked with  
specific missions. The U.S. 1
st
, 4
th
, 9
th
, 101
st
, and 25
th 
Infantry Divisions depended upon 
aviation support from 1
st
 Aviation Brigade units, beyond what their own organic  
battalions provided.
152
 By 1966, the potential offered by attached helicopters signaled a 
shift in traditional infantry capabilities. 
          
153
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Who knows best?: Ground commanders and utilizing their “assets”  
 Although they were independent of the infantry, ground commanders used non-
organic helicopters as he would any other asset typically assigned to them. This made for 
a good working relationship for helicopter crews who habitually supported the same 
ground unit, but it could cause problems between those who were not as well acquainted. 
Infantry commanders could on occasion not fully appreciate helicopter crews‘ 
procedures, demanding performance of duties outside of what was considered safe, 
advisable, or efficient. Since the Army believed that the helicopter‘s role was to assist 
ground operations, infantry leaders viewed any attached aircraft and its crew as a direct 
asset, subject to orders and under their chain of command. This is not a particularly 
curious line of thinking, as for the most part helicopters rarely acted in any capacity other 
than aiding the infantry – it stood as the basis on which airmobility was built.
154
  
 Army Aviation found that a lack of familiarity, or blatant disregard, among 
ground commanders about correct procedures could result in a misallocation of attached 
aircraft. Helicopters sent to resupply infantry units found themselves ordered to insert or 
extract ground forces in ―instantaneous combat assaults,‖ which was in ―complete 
disagreement with all instructions and standard operating procedures in force.‖
155
 Not 
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only were the air crews unprepared, but because requests had not traveled the official 
channels they were without their customary gunship support or accompanied by other 
aircraft to assist in their own recovery if shot down. Officially such practices were ―a 
misuse of aircraft resources and a potential hazard to all personnel concerned.‖
 156
 
Unplanned detours also affected the support others expected to receive from the aircraft 
in question. More importantly, though, these instances indicate the attitudes of some 
among the infantry – that helicopters existed to satisfy their unit‘s desire, regardless of 
customary procedures.
 
In the minds of pilots, either intentionally or not, ground 
commanders abused their authority.
157
  
 Despite any hesitation pilots and crews, or even aviation battalion commanders 
for that matter, felt about fulfilling missions ordered by ground units, it was still their 
duty to comply. The 1
st
 Aviation Brigade made known that their roles were well defined. 
As to the question of ―what a guy does or should do when he feels he has to turn down a 
mission or the mission is too difficult,‖ they had an obligation: ―The weather can be 
deteriorating – the question of too much fire in an area, too hot an LZ, etc. The basic 
principle throughout is that the ground commander is the boss and let‘s not forget it or let 
our people forget it! If ground commanders want our people to do something, we do 
it!‖
158
 Though assault helicopter units still possessed options by appealing through 
aviation channels, the matter ultimately rested upon the fundamental concept of 
maintaining a rapport with ground commanders. ―The best way to avoid a fracas of this 
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sort‖ the brigade advised, ―is to have personal relationships to avoid anything 
approaching an argument in this direction.‖
159
 Above all, their rapport had to be strong 
enough that they ―accept your advice and try to find a way of performing the missions as 
required.‖
160
 Without a doubt, proper liaison between supporter and those whom they 
supported remained one of the most important aspects of non-organic airmobile unit 
operations.       
  In some ways there was a noticeable difference between the typical infantryman 
and the air crews who flew them to and from combat. Though they all received the same 
basic training and belonged to the larger organization, given the lack of a dedicated 
aviation branch it became easy for ranking officers to marginalize and subordinate the 
contribution of aviation personnel. To an extent there was a distance between pilots and 
troops on the ground. In the instance of non-organic helicopter units, they lived 
separately, only generally coming into contact during assigned missions; still, it was rare 
for crews to see the same infantryman twice, let alone strike up a close relationship.
161
 
Even during occasions when they did meet, many were unrecognizable to each other. 
Pilots existed as disconnected voices in the sky, and when in-flight with passengers the 
close proximity between cabin and cockpit belied the real impossibility of gaining 
familiarity – flight noise, complicated procedures, lack of an intercom system to the 
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passengers, and a general high level of concentration on the task at hand prevented any 
attempts at acquaintanceship.
162
  
 When they did have the fortune to meet on the ground and in a relaxed 
environment, however, it was a chance to bond. ―It wasn‘t too often that guys on the 
ground met the men who supported them and vice versa,‖ mentions Colonel David 
Hackworth, ―so there was immediate camaraderie among us. And there was a lot of 
mutual respect, too. We looked in awe at the pilots for some of the amazing risks they 
took in our support…the pilots treated us infantry guys as if we were Wyatt Earp 
gunfighters in the old Tombstone bar.‖
163
 Certainly many of the younger infantrymen 
appreciated the advantage helicopters offered them, but for many ground commanders it 
ultimately came down to their belief the aircraft was simply a tool at their disposal, an 
added dimension on the battlefield, ―‗another vehicle, another weapons system‘ – but one 
that could fly.‖
164
 
 Even the more mundane tasks of assault helicopter units required a degree of 
communicating proper procedures to supported ground units. Not all helicopter pilots 
spent the majority of their tour flying combat assaults. Rather, the day-to-day routine 
consisted mainly of resupplying infantry units in various locations, either at fire support 
bases or in the field during active operations. Though not necessarily considered combat 
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missions, these ―log‖ missions [logistics], or ―ash and trash‖ as crews typically termed 
them, were still dangerous in their own right. They may not have been massed assaults 
into landing zones under enemy fire, but ash and trash flights still required flying over 
enemy territory. 
  Of importance also was the strain upon the crews. W.T. Grant, a pilot with the 
17
th
 Assault Helicopter Company explains the difference in missions and the frustration 
they caused. Assigned aircraft resupplied infantry battalions, hauling the needed ―food, 
ammunition, medical supplies, and equipment that the battalion would need until its next 
log bird arrived. The log bird was also required to perform the ‗admin‘ missions for the 
battalion – hauling the battalion commander around to visit his companies, replacement 
soldiers to the field, short-timers and injured soldiers to the rear.‖ As routine as the tasks 
sound, occasionally pilots confronted the inability of ground units to plan their resupplies 
well enough, causing the mission to be ―frequently interrupted by captain so-and-so who 
wanted to go here or there. Log missions were usually long and frustrating.‖
165
 Certainly 
helicopter crews were in a support role, subject to the whims of those who they assisted, 
but it made it no less easy on the aviators. Arriving alone at infantry bases and delivering 
men and supplies could give one the impression helicopters were little more than ―taxi-
cabs‖ for the rest of the Army.  
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  As the war progressed and ground commander became more comfortable using 
helicopters, micro-management of combat assaults developed into an increasing 
annoyance to aviation battalions. By 1968 records show intensified efforts by ground 
units to usurp dedicated chains of command during operations. Army General John J. 
Tolson asserts that he was struck by ―the matter-of-fact attitude‖ of how ground 
commands that used attached helicopters saw these assets. After the initial trials of 1965 
and into the offensive operations of 1966-67, ―these units took airmobility for granted,‖ 
oftentimes simply considering ―themselves as much airmobile as the 1
st
 Cavalry Division 
although they were not officially designated as such.‖
166
 It became more prevalent as the 
war progressed, but Tolson is spot-on with his assertion that ―Every commander 
instinctively knew that he could do certain things with ‗his‘ Hueys. . . .‖ That predilection 
towards hyper-management was not lost on the supporting aviation companies.
167
  
 Command and control aircraft which offered infantry officers the ability to direct 
their ground elements, transformed into airborne headquarters of over-controlling leaders. 
Their attempts to appropriate helicopter assets mid-operation often devolved the combat 
assaults into micro-managed turmoil. During the end of 1968 the 101
st
 Aviation Battalion 
determined that ―routine missions are over controlled to the point where aviators are 
almost removed from the planning phase completely.‖
168
 Though standard operating 
procedures dictated that a C&C aircraft should control the operation, the aviation 
battalion considered this a ―misutilization‖ of aircraft when the routine mission only 
                                                 
166
  Tolson, Airmobility, 84.  
167
  Ibid., 84, 85.  
168
  Department of the Army, Headquarters 101
st
 Aviation Battalion (Assault Helicopter), ―Operational 
Report of 101
st
 Aviation Battalion (Assault Helicopter) for Period Ending 31 January 1969,‖ p. 8, Aviation 
Box 351, Folder 3, RG 472, NACP.  
66 
 
 
 
consisted of five troop-carrying helicopters. If properly briefed by the ground units, they 
argued, there was ―no substantial reason for the infantry commander and staff officers to 
control routine missions. Aviation flights have been accomplishing this for years, and are 
capable of continuing to do so without‖ the added complication of a C&C aircraft.
169
  
 Though the infantry had been touting heli-borne warfare as the wave of the future 
for some time, combat proved there was a long way to go before aviation and infantry 
could operate together smoothly. A simple lack of experience or inflexibility among 
ground commanders meant some did not comply with what assault helicopter units 
determined to be the correct procedures. Whether they viewed the aircraft as taxi cabs or 
their own personal air force, without acting in accordance with the appropriate methods, 
their actions could either cause waste or put helicopter crews needlessly in danger. 
Despite the occasional issues when facing obdurate infantry commanders, Army Aviation 
continued to develop, refine, and implement their combat procedures. 
My backyard, my methods 
  The third factor to affect the development of assault helicopter doctrine was an 
effort to standardize techniques and procedures. Due to the disparity in geography, 
mission, and unit standard procedures, it was difficult, if not impossible, to draft an 
overall Vietnam tactical manual. Aviation commands could sometimes employ varied 
and unique standard procedures, different than those employed by similar units elsewhere 
in Vietnam. This lack of a unified approach offered many helicopter units a degree of ad 
hoc improvisation, unburdened by a prescribed doctrine. 
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 Despite the inherent difficulty, the 1
st
 Aviation Brigade attempted to solve the 
practice of diverse procedures among their subordinate units. Beginning in 1966, in the 
early weeks of their existence, Brigade Commander Brigadier General Seneff made 
known his desire to emphasize standardized methods of operations, mentioning in his 
first official correspondence to his brigade that ―This headquarters will publish a tactics 
and techniques SOP covering these and other subjects as a first priority task.‖
170
 
Believing standardized ―flying tactics and operational techniques‖ could improve 
―overall mission capability,‖ the issue was worth mentioning as the very first official 
order of business which the commander wished to address. Throughout 1966 the brigade 
conducted command and staff visits to its subordinate battalions and companies to study 
each one‘s methods for the area. Their purpose was to collect information which could 
―result in standardizing, as much as possible, the techniques and procedures to be used in 
all areas of operation.‖
171
  
 The basis of the doctrine traced back to the 11
th
 Air Assault Division – no surprise 
given Seneff‘s former affiliation. From there, the brigade‘s own combat experience 
culled from official reports and comments from the field augmented the principles as 
used by the 1
st
 Cavalry Division.
172
 The resulting Brigade Operations Manual detailed 
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pertinent aspects of airmobility – specifically products of a Vietnam experience – 
intended for consumption by aviator and infantryman alike. Not only did it allow the 
command to offer a program of consistent procedures for ease of operations, but it 
informed the ground units of assault helicopters‘ capabilities. 
 In a sense the brigade knew that they would encounter some amount of obduracy 
amongst the infantry units. Seneff‘s language on the matter is offensive-minded, warning 
his subordinates that ―Selling this isn‘t going to be easy.‖
173
 One must appreciate that the 
infantry whom the 1
st
 supported were not as extensively trained as the 1
st
 Cavalry in the 
methods of heli-borne warfare. The manual served to introduce many techniques in 
which ground commanders may not have been well accustomed in hopes of ―stressing 
capabilities and limitations of supporting aviation units.‖
174
 As a means to acquaint the 
supported infantry, the brigade sent a ―Briefing Team‖ to each major command in-
country throughout 1967.
175
   
 In order to foster strong relationships between ground units and their aviation 
support, as often as possible non-organic helicopter commands attempted to pair specific 
aviation units with infantry battalions they had supported in the past. The 1
st
 Aviation 
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Brigade found after discovering harmonious relationships they should capitalize upon 
these experiences and in future instances continue such pairings when feasible. In a real 
sense this practice was only logical, because the ―more a supporting aviation unit knows 
about its supported unit, the better its capability of providing the best possible 
support.‖
176
 Once aviators became comfortable with how particular infantry units 
operated, their services could become better utilized, with less time and effort wasted re-
orientating their methods for whom they supported. Good rapport between the 
commanders of ground and aviation assets was key to ―build and sustain a unique 
confidence which has proven substantially responsible for maintaining operational 
stability during critical combat situations.‖
177
 Quite clearly, interpersonal relationships 
dictated much of airmobility‘s success or possible failure.   
 Due to the varied terrain in Vietnam, not every unit throughout the country 
adhered to the same tactical procedures. The mountains of northern RVN often 
necessitated entirely different operating techniques than in the rice paddies of the south. 
Helicopter crews who faced densely forested areas met with the reality that available 
landing zones proved difficult to find and even more challenging to use safely. Aviators 
operating in the Delta region employed altered procedures tailored to meet the enemy 
resistance in the area, oftentimes local Viet Cong, not the North Vietnamese regulars to 
the north.
178
 Varied terrain consisted of more than mountains and paddies as popular 
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memory may suggest, however. Wooded areas covered flat ground, hedgerows or other 
barriers often bordered farm fields, and heavily vegetated plateaus covered in mostly high 
grasses obscured distances to the ground.
179
 As a result, helicopter companies or 
battalions devised methods applicable to the geographical environments in which they 
operated.  
 Unique procedures, common to one unit but unusual to others, made it difficult to 
work alongside helicopter units unfamiliar with a particular area. The 101
st
 Aviation 
Battalion discovered the disparity in each aviation unit‘s techniques during the 1969 
operation Lamar Plain. Normally headquartered in central I Corps, a company from the 
battalion relocated to southern I Corps in preparation for Lamar Plain. One of the 
fundamental lessons the 101
st
 learned during the operation dealt with how their 
techniques compared to other units. They noted that ―Aviation units have to be versatile 
on all combat operations‖ and Lamar Plains ―proved that different units in Vietnam have 
completely different tactics and means of employing these tactics.‖
180
 The point was not 
academic, as ―Small problems were encountered by the use of set tactics and two units 
working together without an understanding of the others tactics.‖
181
 Many assault 
helicopter battalions had spent considerable effort standardizing methods within their 
own unit. 
                                                                                                                                                 
violent.‖ They proposed airmobile units exercise ―SOP‘s [sic] and battle drills which permit quick response 
to tactical opportunities and changes in the situation.‖ Recognizing this was a unique necessity to certain 
areas, though, they warned that this discussion regarded ―situations particular to operations in the Delta 
area and does not necessarily apply, in all cases, to other regions or tactical zones in RVN.‖ Department of 
the Army, Headquarters, 1
st
 Aviation Brigade, ―Tactical Lessons Learned Nr. 2,‖ p.2, 8 November 1966, 
Box 9, Folder 1, George P. Seneff Papers, USAMHI.   
179
 General Hamilton H. Howze, ―An Appraisal of Army Aviation in Vietnam,‖ Army Aviation, Vol. 15, 
No. 1 (November 20, 1966), 22.   
180
 Ibid., 7.  
181
 Ibid.  
71 
 
 
 
 Just as particular areas of operation (AO) required unique approaches, the infantry 
also tailored their operations to the geographic areas in which they operated. As these 
ground and air commands worked together, they formed a mostly unofficial approach to 
their AO, sharing an understanding of how best to use their assets. For this reason, in the 
instance of II Field Force Vietnam, planners often strove for a continuity of pairing 
assault helicopter companies (AHCs) with familiar ground units.
182
 Reportedly, due to 
the exhortations of one commanding general there, the pairing of aviation units to 
specific infantry counterparts remained mostly consistent. He was heard to have quipped 
in response to a suggested reassignment in the Mekong River Delta, ―Don‘t take that unit 
out of there; they‘ve got web-feet!‖
183
  
 An appreciation of how terrain affected tactics was not lost on one officer who 
explained that ―Up north, for example, there were jungles and hill, and forests. The 
Choppers had to come in vertically over 150-200-foot trees into holes in the vegetation.‖ 
Operations in the Mekong River Delta of III and IV Corps meant ―the aircraft were used 
a lot with boats, and this required different techniques. And in rice paddy areas, troops 
have to be inserted in a totally different way….‖
184
 Fundamentally, the officer illustrates 
his understanding ―that the areas are so different,‖ it necessitated that ―the expertise that 
is developed in each should be kept there.‖
185
 Overall, standardization of aviation 
techniques across Vietnam was not easily solvable as a result of terrain, areas of 
operation, and command relationships.   
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The Enemy Reacts 
 The final component to affect developments in techniques and procedures was the 
opposition‘s own reaction to helicopters. Due to an increased presence of Army aircraft, 
throughout 1966 and onward the NVA and VC shifted their tactics in response to the 
helicopter threat. Reversion back to guerrilla-type warfare and employment of 
increasingly lethal anti-helicopter devices illustrated a growing familiarity with U.S. 
capabilities and procedures. Their adjustments required Army Aviation not only note the 
changes, but to respond to them effectively.   
 Employment of anti-helicopter techniques and devices by the enemy during the 
Vietnam War began with primitive measures, but gradually they grew in lethality and 
sophistication. The Viet Cong understood well the importance of LZs to heli-borne 
operations, and captured documents from 1966 exposed this reality.
186
 Knowledge of 
anti-helicopter methods filtered up through the chain of command, garnering attention 
even in the Pentagon. In a 1967 Pentagon press briefing the 1
st
 Aviation Brigade‘s 
commander mentioned that ―The enemy in RVN has tried to develop effective means to 
impede heli-borne operations. New enemy tactics require a concentrated effort on our 
part to learn their techniques in sufficient time to render them ineffective.‖
187
 Common 
methods included planting mines and booby traps in potential landing zones with the aim 
of destroying vulnerable aircraft. Army helicopters encountered both pressure and 
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command detonated mines and most often these devices were affixed to trees, hidden on 
rice paddy dikes, or small mounds. American standard procedure to counter these threats 
became the employment of Air Force ―daisy cutters‖ – a conventional bomb used to 
demolish large tracts of dense foliage with devastating effectiveness – in order to destroy 
any such devices. Commanders were also advised to avoid landing on dikes and away 
from tree lines where mines or booby traps were likely located.
188
 Despite their best 
attempts at altering procedures, though, aviation units could sometimes employ almost 
formulaic approaches to combat assaults.
189
 Certainly air assaults could become habitual 
in their execution, as not all required innovative thinking. Changes in the enemy‘s tactics, 
though, ultimately forced aviation units to revaluate their standard procedures and 
appreciate their adversary‘s own capabilities.  
  The most noticeable change made by the opposition, though, was their 
unwillingness to fight conventionally as they had at Ia Drang. U.S. mobility and quick 
reaction time meant NVA and VC forces were not likely to offer open battle, and 
throughout 1966 they had proven increasingly difficult to find. A larger American 
presence and the growing numbers of aviation units forced a dispersion of their once-
concentrated units. It does not seem too unusual that the Viet Cong and North 
Vietnamese Army would shift their tactics; not to do so would have meant an inability to 
evolve just as most militaries are obligated to do when faced with battlefield defeats. 
Americans noted modification of their ground-unit maneuvers in late 1966 when the 1
st
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Aviation Brigade observed that because of continued U.S. victories ―it has become 
apparent that the Viet Cong now consider it tactically unsound to mass their troops. This 
is primarily due to the airmobility available to the ground forces . . . . Therefore the VC 
seem to have chosen a regressive path back to guerilla type warfare.‖
190
 Understanding 
that changes in the opposition‘s tactics required appropriate counter-measures, the 
brigade suggested reviewing their current procedures ―in order to adapt new techniques 
that are tailored to the changing tactics of ground forces on both sides. Units should 
concentrate on developing more effective methods of accomplishing missions . . . .‖
191
 
Changes in ground maneuvers directly affected how helicopters assisted the infantry they 
supported, meaning previously utilized techniques required alterations. 
  It was in part the increased presence of U.S. aircraft that caused the insurgents 
and regular units to become more difficult to find. During this period the scale of 
helicopter operations and the numbers available increased dramatically. Eleven Army 
helicopter companies deployed to Vietnam in early 1966, increasing Westmoreland‘s 
inventory to 1,374 Hueys. An additional sixteen companies arrived during the first six 
months of 1967, followed by twenty-three in the latter half.
192
 Tied intimately with the 
growing strategy of attrition, the Army upheld the belief that airmobility was ―one of the 
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major tactical advantages possessed by the allied forces.‖
193
 Throughout 1966, however, 
they understood that airmobility had to adapt. It was clear that the ―techniques of 
airmobile operations are undergoing continual refinement and new lessons are being 
learned as different environmental conditions or different enemy tactics and techniques 
are encountered.‖
194
  
 When the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong did come out of their sanctuaries to 
fight during the 31 January 1968 Tet Offensive, assault helicopter units altered their 
normal procedures in response. The enemy‘s comprehensive night-time attack on urban 
centers, government buildings, and many major allied installations required 
improvisation from Army Aviation. Assault helicopter companies flew throughout the 
night supplying isolated outposts and bases with crucial supplies. Breaking up into 
smaller elements the next day, sometimes only one or two helicopters each, AHCs hauled 
badly need supplies to replenish those used throughout the night of frenetic battle. They 
made numerous assaults, picking up and inserting infantry in attempts to surround and 
destroy the fleeing enemy who retreated in fractured bands. Small unit actions typified 
most of the aviation operations in response to Tet, lasting weeks after the initial 
offensive.
195
 Operationally their response to a surprise offensive demonstrated procedural 
dexterity among aviation units, forcing ad hoc revision to how most pilots were used to 
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operating. For the entirety of Vietnam, Army Aviation had to alter continually their 
methods and procedures in direct response to the actions of their opposition. The best 
illustration of that fact, however, is found in the culminating U.S. operation of the war, 
where prior experience and methods did not prepare helicopter units for a more 
sophisticated North Vietnamese Army.   
The Reckoning: Lam Son 719 
 The NVA demonstrated in 1971 just how sophisticated their weapons and anti-
helicopter methods had become during the United States-supported Operation Lam Son 
719.
196
 An offensive into Laos by American and South Vietnamese forces in order to 
disrupt the flow of supplies into RVN, the operation proved to be a final large test of 
airmobility in the Vietnam War.
197
 The tactics pioneered and refined throughout South 
Vietnam proved disastrous in Laos. Despite the Army‘s mostly successful 
implementation of airmobility to date, Lam Son 719 was a sobering event which called 
their helicopter doctrine into question. The operation was a milestone while 
simultaneously a black-eye for Army Aviation. Though, it was the largest singular mass 
air assault in their history to that point, it also exacted the worst rate of attrition in aircraft 
shot down or damaged during the decade of conflict. 
 In the months preceding Lam Son 719, American and South Vietnamese 
intelligence showed that North Vietnamese intentions for the coming dry season in Laos, 
October 1970 to April 1971, was to open up supply lines into RVN in preparation for a 
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large offensive. With this information in mind, allied forces planned to disrupt their 
opposition‘s supply routes and halt the offensive before it began. Given U.S. President 
Richard Nixon‘s policy of Vietnamization – an attempt to lessen the American presence 
in Vietnam by handing over more operational responsibility to the South Vietnamese 
military – no U.S. troops took part in the ground portion of Lam Son 719. It constituted 
the largest combined operation between the allies. Allied planners intended to evidence 
the ARVN‘s progress in combat effectiveness by giving them the responsibility for 
ground unit actions.
198
 Rules of engagement limited the extent to which Americans could 
operate. Helicopter pilots could not land while in Laos unless inserting or extracting 
troops, or while delivering supplies and equipment.
199
  American forces, however, 
provided the crucial air support in helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. Chief among the 
helicopter assets was the 101
st
 Airborne Division (Airmobile), who provided the bulk of 
supporting aircraft with their own organic assets, along with sundry other aviation units 
under temporary operational control.
200
   
 Throughout the era of direct American involvement in Vietnam, the war qualified 
as a ―low-intensity conflict‖ – an insurgency of varying composition fought by small 
units utilizing basic weapons and tactics. By the late 1960s and into 1970, however, after 
the Ho Chi Minh trail began operating more effectively and dedicated anti-aircraft 
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weaponry from sympathetic communist countries could arrive in the south, helicopter 
crews began facing more lethal armaments. Along with these weapons the NVA 
developed a greater understanding of how to employ them against helicopters. Lam Son 
719 was the first time Army Aviation experienced the more complicated North 
Vietnamese weapons and tactics, qualifying as a ―mid-intensity conflict‖ where 
―combatants employ their most modern military technology and military resources short 
of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.‖
201
 Beyond the threat of booby-traps and 
rocket propelled grenades in the landing zones to which American crews had become 
accustomed, this was an entirely different menace. Helicopter pilots and crews had no 
prior experience on which to rely when they initially launched the operation. Stateside 
training, in-country orientation, and prior combat knowledge offered no suggestions for 
dealing with such a dense network of formidable surface-to-air weaponry.  
 Neutral Laos offered the enemy an advantage in planning and capabilities. 
Understanding the likelihood of an allied cross-border offensive, communist forces 
prepared defensively. Additionally, unlike in South Vietnam where Americans could 
preclude substantial massing of men and equipment, NVA preparations could occur with 
greater ease.
202
 Utilizing their knowledge of LZ and PZ ambush techniques, the North 
Vietnamese Army was able to bring to bear concentrated fire on Army aircraft.
203
 The 
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NVA effectively coordinated their complex network of air defenses and accurately fired 
upon LZs and PZs. Some anti-aircraft weaponry was radar-controlled and they directed 
simultaneous mortar, artillery, and rocket fire towards the most potential landing and 
pickup zones throughout the area.
204
 
  Due to the dense and effective ground fire, U.S. gunship support, so effective in 
most previous air assaults, could do little to suppress the anti-aircraft threat. Lift units 
found themselves overwhelmed throughout most of the forty-five day operation. So 
accurate was the anti-aircraft fire that every mission, no matter size or objective, required 
specific planning to lessen the risk of more grievous losses.
205
 Few aircraft did not 
experience some degree of combat damage. For those waiting at Khe Sanh, the staging 
area for aviation units during the operation, returning helicopters crippled by enemy fire 
became a common sight. One aviator commented that ―Army pilots were living proof of 
months of difficult training. Countless repetitive emergency procedures were put to 
reflexive use.‖
206
    
 Throughout most of the Vietnam War, flights often flew at an advised 1,500 feet 
or higher to avoid small arms fire, and due to safety concerns combat assaults usually 
adhered to this recommendation. However, in Laos such guidelines exposed aircraft to 
accurate ground-to-air fire. By the end of Lam Son 719, helicopter pilots used single ship 
insertions at thirty second intervals combined with low level flight into and out of the 
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landing or pick-up zones in order to avoid enemy fire.
207
 Operational flexibility was the 
hallmark of the operation, as it required quick adaptability by assault helicopter 
companies to the combat situation.    
 Understanding the unique nature of Lam Son 719 in terms of the overall Vietnam 
experience, the 101
st 
Airborne Division‘s headquarters conducted considerably thorough 
examinations of the operation in an attempt to ―record the history of the airmobile aspects 
. . . and derive lessons and guidelines to improve current and future airmobile operations, 
organization, and doctrine.‖
208
 The Division looked towards the future of airmobile 
operations, disseminating the lessons learned from Lam Son 719 most directly applicable 
to Europe and mid-intensity conflict, something they deemed a ―special case.‖ Regardless 
of the uniqueness of the operation, they felt that it represented the positive aspects of 
airmobility, which confirmed ―the soundness and validity of the concept and principles of 
airmobility developed and practiced by the United States Army.‖
209
 Despite the historical 
memory of the operation as one which constituted a Pyrrhic victory – losses in 
helicopters outweighed the true gains made during Lam Son 719 – the 101
st
 considered it 
a matter of perspective. The division felt there were ―remarkably few helicopters and 
crew members lost‖ in spite of the high numbers of sorties flown in heavy anti-aircraft 
and ground fire ―on NVA home ground.‖
210
    
 The very nature of what the airmobile units experienced in Laos was something to 
which they were not accustomed. For close to a decade Army Aviation operated against a 
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rather unsophisticated foe. Though the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong made efforts to 
combat helicopters, they did not constitute a grave surface-to-air threat until 1971. Even 
then it was perhaps more due to the particular circumstances of their extensively-prepared 
sanctuary area. To some, the operation was proof that airmobility was a flawed concept. 
It could be heralded, however, as an illustration of the developing nature of the concept 
itself. Official reports are replete with observations of methods and procedures unique to 
Lam Son 719 – few prior operations received such thorough analysis. It provided insight 
that the previous decade of combat knowledge could not. In that regard, Lam Son 719 is 
an appropriate bookend to the story of helicopter operations. It emphasizes the continual 
adaptation and refinement of procedures, techniques, and tactics used by Army assault 
helicopters throughout the Vietnam War. 
Conclusion 
 Following the 1
st
 Cavalry Division‘s actions during the1965 Pleiku Campaign it 
appeared evident that airmobility was to become an important aspect of American 
military operations. It is likely few could imagine, however, the extent to which 
helicopters became, arguably, the major component of the U.S. Army effort in Southeast 
Asia. Indeed, examples of effusive praise for the helicopter abound from members of the 
Army. Much of their approval mirrors one aviation battalion commander‘s belief that 
―The helicopter in Vietnam has proven itself beyond any doubt as the vehicle primarily 
responsible for the success of our ground forces in the combat theater.‖
211
 Central among 
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the types of aircraft was the utility helicopter, one which flew daily – and nightly – across 
South Vietnam completing numerous tasks.  
 Noteworthy among the many outcomes of the Army‘s reliance upon helicopters is 
the formation of the 1
st
 Aviation Brigade. Buoyed by the 1
st
 Cavalry Division‘s success at 
Ia Drang and supported by the supreme commander of allied forces, General 
Westmoreland, it should perhaps not be surprising helicopters took on such a crucial role. 
Conventional infantry divisions enjoyed a degree of airmobility not originally envisioned 
by the earliest supporters of the concept; many foresaw dedicated airmobile divisions, but 
few predicted an entire airmobile army. Already by 1966 General Howze noticed that 
many infantry units had gained an airmobile capability not altogether inferior to that of 
the 1
st
 Cavalry. The supply of aircraft eventually met the need, since helicopters had 
become such a crucial requirement. As Howze further notes ―the alternative would be to 
deny them an essential means of combat.‖
212
 To a large degree, the Army did become 
airmobile; if not officially designated as such they certainly relied upon that capability in 
a real sense. American military planners designed the types of operations infantry units 
undertook in Vietnam throughout 1966 and into 1971 with the helicopter in mind. Indeed, 
one can hardly imagine the offensives which typified the era as possible with 
conventional transportation means. 
 These capabilities were not something the Army inherently knew how to exercise 
from the outset, though. Rather, it required imagination and gradual innovations to refine 
the methods of utilizing helicopters in a counterinsurgency. Given Army Aviation‘s 
relative youth, Vietnam was the requisite testing ground needed to improve their doctrine. 
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While other Army branches had the benefit of decades or more of preparation to solidify 
procedures, assault helicopter units operated on a very limited basis of experience. 
Conversely, those with whom aviators worked had even less of an understanding. In 1966 
Brigadier General Seneff commented that ―All other combat branches of the Army have 
firm tactical doctrine. Liaison, communications, operational planning, support procedures 
and tactics have been developed over a long period of time and are accepted as standard 
throughout the military.‖
213
 In order to become effective quickly Army Aviation had to 
become just as consistent with their methods to facilitate understanding among the 
infantry of how to use helicopters. Assuredly, the Army entered Vietnam as a force 
familiar with helicopters, but not intimately knowledgeable in the methods required to 
combat an insurgency with them. They had to devise those means, while simultaneously 
creating reliable and efficient doctrine.  
 As a result of the culmination of knowledge gained successively throughout the 
war, an altered strategic approach, and in response to the enemy‘s own tactical revisions, 
there was never a moment when airmobility and helicopter techniques became solidified 
enough not to demand further modifications. Indeed, regarding the enemy‘s effect on 
procedures one colonel commented in 1966 that ―One cannot tell from one day to the 
next what reaction will come from the enemy . . . . Every day sees changes in tactics and 
techniques as the continuous quest for better methods of defeating the VC goes on.‖
214
 
Throughout the historical record, official reports from aviation units contain innumerable 
instances of an army coming to terms with their mission and the procedures which could 
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best serve the objectives. To some degree it necessitated winning over some obdurate 
members of the ground forces community, educating all as to the potential and correct 
employment of helicopters on the modern battlefield. If airmobility came of age in 1966, 
it matured further in the following years. In the main, the concept was sound, but 
refinements in tactics, procedures, and mission signaled there was still much to learn 
about its usage. How Army Aviation communicated such insight, theories, and ideas was 
crucial in order to remain a viable force. For that it required a network of information 
channels to translate experiences from the pilot‘s seat into inherited wisdom.   
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CHAPTER 3: COMMUNICATING AND DISSEMINATING INNOVATION 
  ―How many costly mistakes have been repeated and lives lost as the thousands of 
Army aviators . . . searched for effective tactics and techniques which had already been 
employed but not shared?‖
215
 This question posed by a major in 1968 was a relevant one 
at the time. Battlefield knowledge collected by helicopter units about how to combat an 
insurgency had the propensity to become confused, if not lost, unless compiled in an 
efficient manner. As a result there were four main methods of relating combat 
experience. First, the official Army Operational Report – Lessons Learned detailed 
aspects of operations conducted in Vietnam. Second was the publication of military 
periodicals containing articles which encouraged an unofficial dissemination of ideas. 
Third, a close connection between Vietnam battlefields and Army Aviation‘s training 
schools ensured a curriculum that reflected combat experiences. Finally, in-country 
orientation, which taught pilots newly-arrived in Vietnam refined training alongside 
veterans. All of these methods constituted extensive means of relating insights and 
translating them into reliable doctrine. It is demonstrative of a military coming to terms 
with a new technology, and an example of how such a force reports, interprets, and 
evaluates knowledge gained through combat experience.  
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Operational Reports – Lessons Learned 
 Among the official means of communicating new information was the 
Operational Report – Lessons Learned (OR-LL). They were a record of ―significant 
organization or unit activities‖ in which each unit took part throughout three month 
periods, including total hours flown, combat losses, and the manifold logistics of war. In 
contrast to the sometimes narrow-sighted after-action reports, OR-LLs generally 
examined the larger picture of how and where a particular unit operated during the 
reporting period. Most important for tactical evolution, though, were the ―lessons 
learned‖ portion of each OR-LL. Not only did they provide a historical account of 
specific units, but they enabled the Army to record the observations and 
recommendations of combat commanders.
216
 Importantly, these covered multiple aspects 
of combat, including ―joint and combined operations and support activities pertinent to 
doctrine, organization, equipment, training, administration, techniques, and tactics.‖
217
 
The lessons learned contained issues encountered during all types of sorties or operations. 
Commanders expressed ideas on tactics, techniques, and procedures, and recommended 
action at the appropriate level.
218
  
 To a great extent these items reveal that certain issues could come to light only on 
the battlefield. In the words of one aviation battalion commander the ―lessons to be 
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learned in airmobile concepts can only be taught here in the combat theater.‖
219
 
Airmobility, he argued, was still evolving, and ―solutions to heliborne tactics are still 
being discovered, still being exploited. The hard, fast, rules still emanate from the fire 
received in an enemy occupied landing zone.‖
220
 Though prior stateside tests provided a 
foundation, combat dictated what truly worked, and Army Aviation relied on OR-LLs to 
communicate that information for larger dissemination.    
 The notable aspect of the system was the dialogue it created, as reports from 
subordinate units which filtered up the chain of command required either their agreement 
or ―nonconcur.‖ If the headquarters found the suggestions worth endorsing, those 
solutions could ultimately become standard procedure for other units. Multiple levels of 
the chain of command scrutinized OR-LLs. Eventually the Army Chief of Staff, Force 
Development, Department of the Army in Washington D.C. received the modified report. 
Ultimately, this process directly affected future training, as those involved in the review 
could recommend ―appropriate CONUS [Continental United States] training agencies 
consider the recommendation as stated.‖
221
 For the most part this denoted the Army 
Aviation training center at Fort Rucker, but the benefits of OR-LLs extended beyond 
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aviation, too.
222
 The information acted as academic data for the Army‘s future leaders – 
all branch training schools received copies of the reports ―for review and evaluation,‖ 
including the War College, Armor, Aviation, and Infantry Schools among others.
223
 
Indeed, since airmobility was such an important aspect of the Vietnam-era military, other 
branches would likely benefit from a knowledge of how airmobile units operated.  
  Open exchanges of ideas extended to most of the assault helicopter units. Their 
experiences, difficulties, and solutions became important information for others. 
Dissemination of OR-LLs occurred throughout Vietnam, and in one form or another they 
found relevance among fellow aviation commands. Some, as in the case of the 101
st
 
Airborne Division‘s organic aviation unit, the 101
st
 Assault Helicopter Battalion, 
published a bulletin with salient points gathered from other units, believing that to profit 
adequately from these experiences meant implementing similar methods.
224
 The 1
st
 
Aviation Brigade practiced a similar method. Comprised of tactical lessons from their 
subordinate battalions and companies, they compiled multiple ―Tactical Lessons 
Learned‖ reports ―with a view toward ‗spreading the word‘ so that successful techniques 
employed by one unit may be made known to others so that we may all learn from each 
others [sic] mistakes.‖
225
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 Aviation commands considered any information which might have been helpful to 
the training schools. As the former Director of Army Aviation, brigade commander 
Major General George P. Seneff, Jr. understood the importance of OR-LLs and the 
training curriculum‘s dependence on them. In 1967 he informed his subordinates that 
―My staff is working on, as always, studies on doctrine, tactics and techniques of 
airmobile operations, etc.‖
226
 Partly to help in standardization, but also to be 
―appropriately incorporated in service schools at Rucker, Benning, and other places 
where people are being prepared to come over here.‖
227
 Pointedly, Seneff reveals that this 
effort was ―completely dependent on you people to put good information in Your [sic] 
Operation Lessons Learned and other reporting that you send us.‖
228
 
 Above all, Seneff‘s orders illustrate an important desire to adapt and innovate. In 
June 1966 he emphasized the universality of lessons learned. Encouraging the reporting 
of these issues, he observed that what might appear ―an insignificant or routine approach 
to a problem may be a big help to another unit. Be sure your Quarterly Operations Report 
contains details of lessons learned so we can consolidate and distribute them across the 
board.‖
229
 Seneff advocated even further means of relaying ideas inside the combat 
theater. In an October 1966 memo he urged that ―When you hit upon a tactical, 
                                                 
226
 Department of the Army, Headquarters 1
st
 Aviation Brigade, ―Commander‘s Notes, No. 14‖ (20 July 
1967), p. 3, Box 9, Folder 3, George P. Seneff Papers, USAMHI. 
227
 Ibid. 
228
 Ibid., 3, 4.  
229
  Department of the Army, Headquarters 1st Aviation Brigade, ―Commander‘s Notes, Number 4‖ (17 
June 1966), p. 5, Box 9, Folder 3, George P. Seneff Papers, USAMHI.  
90 
 
 
 
operational or maintenance expedient, basically any means of doing the job better, let us 
know so we can get the word out to others.‖
230
 
 Airmobility as a whole benefited from not only the charismatic personas of 
leaders like Seneff, but also from pilots who provided their experiences to the larger 
aviation community. By relying on operational reports and lessons learned, along with 
other means of in-country analysis, they ensured a program of continual innovations. 
―What is the value of a ‗lessons learned‘ system today?‖ the Army Digest asked in 
1966.
231
 Quite simply ―It acts as the ‗hot line‘ to inform the Department of the Army 
which fundamentals must be stressed in training and what refinements in tactics, doctrine, 
and equipment are necessary.‖
232
 The Army‘s reliance on OR-LLs constituted a 
formalized method of cognitive thought, allowing helicopter units an official voice for 
their ideas and experiences.  
Tell Us a War Story: Communicating Innovation through Service Journals 
 Another key method of relaying techniques and procedures was the circulation of 
periodicals among the Army. The most notable examples are the United States Army 
Aviation Digest (USAAD) and Army Aviation (AA). Both service journals existed for the 
same purpose: to inform the Army Aviation community of notable occurrences. USAAD 
originated from Fort Rucker, home to helicopter training, and fell under direct 
supervision of the school‘s commandant. While an official Department of the Army 
publication, it contained mostly unofficial opinions from its readers. Similarly, AA relied 
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upon the same types for readership and as a source of contributing articles.
233
 Subscribers 
were members of the Army Aviation Association of American (AAAA). Not an official 
Department of the Army magazine, AA was still the product of individuals intimately 
related to, and concerned with, their subject matter. As there was no dedicated aviation 
branch until 1983, what appears in the both periodicals are articles and letters from across 
the Army. 
 In order to foster discussion and dissemination of the most relevant matters 
concerning airmobility and the Army‘s use of helicopters, these magazines solicited 
articles from the aviation community. The majority of contributors were not professional 
writers. Their intention was not necessarily to inform a larger readership of the over-
arching details of what Army Aviation was doing.
234
 Rather, what they produced was 
material meant for a specific readership, informing one another of pertinent specifics 
regarding their employment of aircraft. Covering a myriad of topics, throughout the 
Vietnam-era there was a dynamic exchange of ideas about the role of the helicopter, 
many dealing specifically with its application in Southeast Asia.   
 In 1968 one contributing writer emphasized the importance of relaying battlefield 
experience in USAAD, as he solicited insights among Army Aviation for articles 
pertaining to ―tactics, techniques and procedures.‖
235
 He pointedly observes that the 
―principles of war never change, but the tactics, techniques and procedures used in the 
conduct of war must constantly be changed, improved and modified to retain optimum 
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effectiveness.‖
236
 Previous theories formulated stateside could only carry the Army so 
far, he believed. Experiences in Vietnam revolutionized how helicopter units operated, 
and their dissemination was crucial to understanding how Army Aviation should modify 
their procedures to reflect those lessons. ―Rarely are tactics developed in peacetime,‖ the 
writer asserts, ―and none can be judged effective until they have been tested and proven 
in battle.‖
237
   
 The modification of tactics was not an abrupt process, though. Rather, as he 
argues, it occurred continually as the composite of new experiences across multiple 
phases of combat, the product of trial and error, success and failure. Therefore, it was 
incumbent upon each pilot and every unit commander to ―ensure that his trials, errors, 
experiences, and lessons learned are reported so that others may benefit from them and 
develop more effective tactics, techniques and procedures.‖
238
 Of course, military pilots 
had long relied upon official training material. Indeed, field manuals, training programs, 
and the numerous special texts circulated widely among the aviation community. They 
could not be relied upon, however, to detail the entirety of all pilots‘ collective 
knowledge. The inherent disadvantage was that the writers of these compendiums 
attempted to compile and prepare information from a sometimes limited amount of 
official reports. As the writer saw it, those personnel were not ―fountains of all 
knowledge; they have no crystal balls; they cannot disseminate information which is not 
reported.‖
239
 Crucially, he further noted, they depended on the same people who made up 
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the readership of USAAD, ―the individual on the scene, to provide the much needed 
information.‖
240
  
 Likewise, Army Aviation requested articles from pilots and crews. In April 1966, 
Army Aviation director Colonel Delbert L. Bristol asserted that in order to promote 
doctrinal development Army Aviation members should analyze Vietnam‘s many lessons. 
―To facilitate this study,‖ Bristol observed, ―there is a great need for ‗writers‘ within our 
own ranks who will record their experiences and opinions on every facet of our doctrine 
and techniques.‖
241
 A month later, Brigadier General Robert R. Williams became Army 
Aviation‘s director and indicated his satisfaction with the response specific to ongoing 
operations in Vietnam, acknowledging that ―I have been terribly pleased to note the 
frequency and quality of the many articles now appearing in our aviation-oriented 
magazine on the subject of aviation in Vietnam.‖
242
 The sources were mostly ―our young 
aviators,‖ and Williams argued their contributions had various advantages. Not only did 
they act as an impulse for memories of those who had already served, but they also 
provided priceless advice and observations for those headed to Southeast Asia for their 
own tours. Granted, Williams argued, even though ―many of the techniques and 
procedures put forth by our young stalwarts do not meet our ‗school-book‘ solutions, they 
nevertheless point out that there are many ways to skin the proverbial cat.‖
243
 Indeed, 
many of the articles illustrate the product of battlefield expediencies. They were not 
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contrived in the clinical environment of stateside testing which stressed safety and 
allowed for little latitude outside of by-the-book solutions, but instead, most writers 
proffered ideas formulated in the confusion and tension of actual combat.   
  USAAD‘s discussions of doctrine and techniques had a wider appeal than just 
Army pilots as well. Despite the aviation-specific material, the readership was wide 
enough that those throughout the Army took notice of the publication. ―The DIGEST is 
your magazine,‖ the editors wrote in 1966, ―and your means of obtaining and trading 
information Army-wide.‖
244
 In September 1968 USAAD set a record distribution at 
61,245 copies.
245
 By 1970 their monthly readership reached 500,000.
246
 Principal among 
those non-rated aviators who followed the USAAD closely were ground troops, who not 
only read the magazine but also provided their own ideas on the employment of 
helicopters. As the largest beneficiary of the aircraft, those on the ground were in a 
position to comment upon techniques and proffer solutions to issues about which aviators 
may have not been sufficiently aware. Their propositions were often unique approaches 
to the matter of transporting troops, utilizing helicopters for reconnaissance, or command 
and control. Along with the appeal the Digest had among ground troops, it also met wide 
readership in other military branches.
247
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 Overall, without the benefit of periodicals it is doubtful Army Aviation could 
have communicated ideas between themselves as easily. They provided the necessary 
forum for individual aviators to detail not only their own experiences, but to allow for 
dissemination of new and potentially impactful suggestions. Army Aviation and United 
States Army Aviation Digest were perhaps the two best examples of an unfettered 
communication between combat theater and those stateside. Though what article writers 
offered could sometimes fall outside the common ―school solution,‖ their contributions 
were no less valid for those searching for new methods of executing their assigned 
missions. Without their input other aviators would likely have not been as well informed 
and the Army‘s development of helicopter warfare would doubtlessly not have been as 
dynamic.  
Vietnam-Oriented Stateside Training 
 
 The third method of relating combat experience was through official training. The 
Army Aviation School curriculum was tied intimately to operations in Southeast Asia, as 
it was very likely most would receive orders for service there immediately upon 
graduation.
248
 Increasing demand for aviators beginning in 1964 strained the capabilities 
of the school to produce enough men to fly the much-needed helicopters. As a result, 
pilots received instruction which dispensed with information not pertaining to 
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Vietnam.
249
 Quite literally, ―if training could not be utilized during the tour in Vietnam‖ 
the pilot was likely to forget the instruction, the material was deemed superfluous, ―and 
therefore, was considered not productive.‖
250
 
 The Army Aviation School was ever cognizant of the situation in Vietnam and 
what they should emphasize to prepare their students for an eventual tour there. As 
school commandant, Major General John Tolson visited Vietnam in June 1966. He 
commented that during this trip, his second, he was ―anxious to glean any information 
which I could take back to the Army Aviation School to better prepare the students for 
their service in Vietnam.‖
251
 Seneff felt that, ―the training in the schools from one end to 
the other is pointed toward producing a man tailored for the conditions under which he is 
going to have to operate.‖
252
 Overall, they relied upon experience in-country to keep their 
training curriculum relevant and to reflect the extent of battlefield knowledge gained in 
the combat theater.  
 Army rotary-wing training was a two-phase program. Students learned the 
rudiments of flight, known as Primary Instruction, at Fort Wolters, Texas. These sixteen 
weeks imparted the basic principles of flying a helicopter and required a student complete 
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their solo flight without an instructor in order to advance to the next phase. Upon 
completion of Primary Instruction and having earned their wings, new pilots reported to 
Fort Rucker, Alabama for advanced rotary wing training. It was here that students 
received training covering tactics and procedures. It was also where pilots first 
accustomed themselves to the ubiquitous Huey – likely the type of aircraft most would 
fly in Vietnam.  
 Any training which pilots received in tactics likely originated from the department 
most crucial to collecting and redistributing that knowledge: the Department of Tactics 
(DOT). Charged with presenting advanced, intermediate and basic-level instruction in 
both organization and tactical employment, they also evaluated and coordinated subjects 
relating to ―proposed Army aviation material requirements, doctrine, training, 
organization, tactics, techniques, and procedures.‖
253
 Responsible for classroom and 
flight instruction, their curriculum was geared towards the one contingency of Vietnam. 
Indeed, the war-era Rucker did not resemble its pre-war image. By 1967 ―One of the 
greatest changes,‖ noted a colonel, ―is within the Department of Tactics. All instruction is 
Vietnam-oriented in the most realistic manner possible to parallel the situation the new 
aviator will encounter in Vietnam.‖
254
 Officially, the DOT‘s principal focus was ―RVN 
[Republic of Vietnam] oriented and missions, procedures, and techniques as realistically 
toned to that area as possible.‖
255
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 When not flying, students received classroom instruction which dealt directly 
with scenarios they would likely encounter in-country. Training material described 
potential situations in detail. The Department of Tactics undertook continual reviews of 
their classroom instruction to guarantee the relevancy of Vietnam-oriented 
information.
256
 Proposed tactical situations utilized actual maps of Vietnam, depicting the 
terrain and villages of certain areas as they existed in reality. Though the scenarios 
presented to students were fictitious and did not necessarily mirror that area‘s situation at 
the time, they were representative of what could likely occur.
257
 Realistic portrayals such 
as these were not simply theoretical problems, but operations which occurred on a daily 
basis in Vietnam. Familiarization with the chain of command, who controlled given 
portions of missions, correct procedures in various situations, and potentially suitable 
landing zones all reflected what previous experience in-country deemed crucial 
knowledge.  
 Training emphasized familiarity with Vietnam on multiple levels. During the war, 
the Aviation School renamed parts of Fort Rucker, along with surrounding areas leased 
by the Army, to reflect the various names of Vietnamese cities and provinces.
258
  
Beginning in 1966, during the last week of instruction at Rucker, students executed 
missions at Tac-X, the tactical training site.
259
 Attempting to familiarize further the new 
aviators with what they would soon be experiencing in RVN, students flew simulated 
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combat missions, living in the field throughout the week.
260
 The emphasis during this 
period was on combat realism and during the fourteen day exercise students flew typical 
Vietnam-type missions without instructors on-board.  
 This last phase was ―constantly changing to keep abreast of the needs. Realism 
and practicality are keynotes, and reports from commanders in Vietnam indicate the 
school has been able to maintain the flexibility needed.‖
261
 Tolson intended the last week 
to make up for the lack of unit training, as most pilots deployed as individuals rather than 
in a unit. The emphasis was on incorporating ―as much combat realism as possible to 
facilitate the essential transformation from ‗student‘ to ‗pilot‘.‖
262
  Above all, it was an 
attempt to offer students a greater understanding of what the near future had in store for 
them. Indeed, much of what the instructors covered throughout the final week were 
methods and techniques which would be of daily use in Vietnam.    Pilots also related 
techniques stateside to other aviators through personal instruction. Many who completed 
their year-long tour in Vietnam rotated to Fort Rucker as instructors, bringing with them 
the newest and most relevant information about tactics and procedures. Already by early 
1966 Brigadier General Seneff noted that more than 500 veterans of RVN had become 
faculty members at the aviation schools.
263
 Upon arrival they underwent debriefing ―in an 
attempt to glean information with which to improve its instruction.‖
264
 Seneff encouraged 
those brigade members headed to Fort Rucker to ―strive to share their experience here 
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with the instructors and students at the Aviation School.‖
265
 Aviation director Brigadier 
General Williams felt comfort knowing that with ―the wealth of experience available in 
the Vietnam returnees at our Aviation Schools, I know that our recent and future 
graduates will be the best qualified for Vietnam duty that time and experience can 
give.‖
266
  
 William Meacham, a pilot with the 101
st
 Aviation Battalion, asserts that most 
instructor pilots had already served at least one tour in Southeast Asia, and ―were 
dedicated and professional aviators.‖
267
 Veterans‘ knowledge of what was important in 
combat could serve the student well. Meacham believed it was advantageous if the 
instructor departed from the written lesson plan and taught techniques not officially 
sanctioned. This deviation from the ―school solution‖ was beneficial for most students 
who were looking to gain as much knowledge about their impending tour in Vietnam as 
possible. What worked in the eyes of the safety-conscience school could often differ from 
what battlefield expediencies had taught was a more viable approach. ―In combat,‖ 
Meacham argues, ―there was no such thing as a ‗school solution‘.‖
268
   
 Lower-grade pilots were not the only recipients of the Army Aviation‘s lesson 
learned or the benefactors of personal instruction from Vietnam veterans. By the 
beginning of 1966 the Army decided senior field grade aviators bound for Vietnam 
needed proper orientation in the procedures of ongoing operations. From this 
determination came the Army Aviation Commanders Vietnam Orientation Course 
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(AACVOC).
269
 The first class began in November 1966 at Fort Rucker.
270
 Course 
participants were rated aviators in an aviation command or staff position bound for 
Vietnam. AACVOC reflected the most current information coming out of Southeast Asia, 
combining both the official lessons learned gleaned via official channels, and the 
experiences of returned veterans. Whereas the Army Aviation School intended most of 
their instruction to train individual aviators for their impending tours in Vietnam, the 
Orientation Course dealt specifically with the planning and support aspects of airmobile 
operations. Just as the young pilots operating in Vietnam needed to be well versed in the 
structure of Army operations, their commanders required an equal or better understanding 
of these aspects.  
 Overall, the Army Aviation Schools at Fort Wolters, Fort Rucker, and other 
ancillary facilities were directly linked to the war in Vietnam. The growing importance of 
helicopters to the Army‘s efforts in Southeast Asia meant that a focused, accelerated, and 
efficient program of instruction benefited students bound for the combat zone. A close 
relationship between aviation units in-country and stateside training institutions 
illustrated not only the Army‘s realization that the past informed the future, but that 
efficiency and safety could best be taught through hard-learned lessons. Through a 
specific Vietnam-oriented school curriculum, the wisdom offered by RVN returnees, and 
orientation of command aviation personnel from experienced pilots, the Army insured 
that battlefield knowledge would have a larger doctrine-serving purpose.  
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 Yet, it might have been unrealistic to think the Army Aviation School could 
prepare every student to operate in Vietnam immediately upon their arrival. As one 
Department of Tactics instructor noted in 1969, it was perhaps impossible to meet such 
ambitious combat readiness. The schools could offer a Vietnam-oriented training 
curriculum, one that dealt with realism and put a premium on the current situation in the 
combat theater, but not every student would be immediately operation-ready. He 
correctly notes that most units in Vietnam fought their own war with specific techniques 
to fulfill certain mission objectives. ―Therefore,‖ he asserts, ―‗immediate employment‘ 
would demand as many flight schools as there are aviation units in Vietnam.‖
271
 That 
being an unrealistic expectation, ―the Army compromises by averaging out these various 
techniques and methods and comes up with a training program which they hope will 
make the new aviator qualified to transition into the various aviation units in Vietnam in 
a minimum amount of time.‖
272
 Though their training was as specific as generality would 
allow, the individual aviator relied a great deal on in-country indoctrination to refine the 
methods and techniques he would employ throughout his tour.  
Learning on the Job: In-Country Orientation 
 The final method of relating experience in helicopter warfare was through actual 
combat instruction. In the early years of large-scale American presence in Vietnam, entire 
units such as the 1
st
 Cavalry Division arrived in-country requiring orientation to become 
operational quickly. Units which had operated in Southeast Asia provided a training 
program by allowing the new pilots to fly as copilots during combat missions, offering 
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the somewhat insulated environment of flying with veterans.
273
 As the war progressed, 
however, units remained in-country and a flow of individual aviators rotated in and out. 
The majority of helicopter pilots arrived in Southeast Asia this way, as individual 
replacements. This practice of rotation required a method of receiving and orientating 
new pilots quickly.  
 Upon arriving at their unit in Vietnam, replacements underwent a calculated 
period of in-country training as copilots. Flying alongside veterans as a copilot, or ―peter 
pilot‖, for a period of months allowed them to refine their methods.
274
 The ―aircraft 
commander‖ – a term used to denote a combat veteran, usually with three or more 
months in Vietnam and the primary pilot of a helicopter – was intended to impart tactical 
and general wisdom regarding operations and other aspects of sorties. What resulted were 
pilot-to-pilot tutorials designed to confer the skills which best prepared an aviator to 
complete missions not only successfully, but to keep themselves and their crews alive. 
Such communication of insight was crucial for the mostly inexperienced pilots deployed 
to RVN for the first time.
275
 
  Armed only with simulated combat flying during flight school, the realities of 
Vietnam were far removed from stateside preparation. One assault helicopter pilot 
asserted that ―Vietnam is the school after school.‖
276
 James Joyce joined the 227
th
 Assault 
Helicopter Battalion in 1966 and relates that his mentor ―had me doing things with the 
Huey that I had no idea I, or the Huey, could do.‖ Indeed, inexperience was a hazard for 
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all, and Joyce was fortunate that through exposure ―to intensive instruction Captain Paul 
Silberberger made me a Huey pilot.‖
277
 25
th
 Aviation Battalion pilot Joseph Finch, noted 
that upon deploying to Vietnam ―I was soon to find out Flight School barely qualified me 
to fly in a safe area. Learning the skills I would need to survive a year in Vietnam had 
just begun.‖
278
 Without assistance offered by experienced pilots – even fundamental 
instruction – it is likely new aviators would not have adapted to combat as quickly. 
 Most importantly, veterans could teach lessons with regard to their particular area 
of operation. The lack of standardized techniques across Vietnam obliged a large degree 
of localized orientation. Variables in terrain and operational methods meant there was an 
inherent difficulty in interchanging pilots or units from one area to the next.
279
 Few 
people knew the intricacies of daily operations in particular areas better than the pilots 
who developed specialized adjustments which worked best there. No matter their rank or 
amount of flight experience, all new pilots had to undergo this period of transition. Such 
instruction paid large dividends when it was time for the recipients themselves to pass 
down the skills they learned only months prior.  
  Some methods could vary from aviator to aviator depending on their own abilities 
and the instructions they had received from their own mentors.
280
 As one pilot relates, 
those new in-country had to absorb large amounts of information from multiple mentors. 
Each brought their own prejudices and beliefs about what worked best in given situations, 
but he warns that ―Because one man got burned during a certain maneuver does not rule 
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out the use of that maneuver forever.‖
281
 Conversely, he argues, just because something 
proved successful at one point did not qualify that procedure as the only correct method. 
Stereotyped thinking was inherently dangerous in combat situations with their many 
variables. Ultimately, the pilot advises that ―A new aviator will have to listen to a lot of 
advice based on a lot of experience. He should listen – then adopt that which makes most 
sense to him.‖
282
 Training and orientation for those beginning their tours was often an 
intense period of instruction, requiring them to assimilate the styles and techniques of 
multiple aircraft commanders until they devised their own specific procedures.   
  Time constraints and a general belief that combat was the ultimate training 
ground meant most units openly endorsed on the job training (OJT). Within months of 
their formation, the 1
st
 Aviation Brigade set up a formalized method of training, 
expecting their pilots to know the capabilities and procedures of the unit‘s aircraft and 
then conducting additional mentoring to solve any deficiencies. At that time they flew as 
a copilot for up to twenty-five flight hours during administrative missions. Only then 
were they allowed to fly as a copilot during combat missions, hopefully exhibiting 
enough proficiency that they could eventually be recommended to become an aircraft 
commander. As Seneff saw it, the notable benefit of this system was that it ―provides us 
with sound, and well qualified aviators to fly our combat missions. This approach does, 
in fact, combine training with mission accomplishment, and does ensure that our best 
qualified aviators are filling the right [pilot‘s] seat.‖
283
 Progressively allowing greater 
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responsibility solved the requirement of training and indoctrination while simultaneously 
allowing pilots to become comfortable with their own level of proficiency.    
 While the Army‘s aviation school provided the basic skills necessary, aviators 
still required in-country experience before they were ready to become aircraft 
commanders. Without the advanced training received from veterans and the experience of 
flying combat missions, Army Aviation could not have so capably imparted newly 
devised tactics or procedures. Localized orientation was key to maintaining and passing 
down the combat experience of others – much of which might have never made it into the 
official field manuals, been part of the school curriculum, or made into the pages of 
service periodicals.  
Keeping the Wolf from the Door: Rotation and the Pilot Vacuum 
  
 Army Aviation‘s varied methods of communicating information was ever-more 
important because of the large amount of new pilots they had to field. As American 
troop-levels increased in Vietnam and U.S. forces undertook larger operations, assault 
helicopters took on a more pronounced role. Army Aviation was initially not prepared to 
provide so many aircraft and pilots, and only through marked growth of the training 
programs and organization could they expect to answer the call. Few among them viewed 
this as a negative turn of events, but the demand overwhelmed their ranks, necessitating 
sacrifices from pilots and marking a period of dramatic change. Though the war 
necessitated continual expansions of training outputs, the year-long deployment cycle 
continued to become a central issue for Army Aviation. 
 The 1
st
 Cavalry Division was the first large aviation unit to feel the effects of the 
year-long tour of duty system. Once the pride of Army Aviation, their exceptional 
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performance throughout 1965 was due largely to the experience which pilots carried over 
from stateside training. Indeed, most of the aviators initially assigned to the 1
st
 Cav were 
veterans of the 11
th
 Air Assault tests, comfortable with the tactics and well-acquainted 
with their fellow pilots. In late 1966 their immense amount of experience quickly 
dissipated as pilots rotated out of Vietnam. A nearly mass exodus due to their 
simultaneous arrival in-country a year earlier created an experience gap.
284
 ―Without 
casting aspersions of any sort on the new personnel,‖ Retired General Hamilton Howze 
averred, ―the division, still a fine one, has thus been caused to be closer in experience and 
training in airmobility to other forces in Vietnam.‖
285
 Turnover further hurt the Army in 
these early years because so few initially had much experience with airmobility. 
Personnel who rotated through Vietnam gained knowledge about airmobile operations 
mostly through combat exposure, but that theater was the sole provider of certain lessons.  
 While the Army struggled to provide units in-country with replacements, those 
returning from Vietnam likely faced a rotation back to RVN. By 1966 the Army realized 
the conclusive need for multiple tours. Then Director of Army Aviation, Colonel Delbert 
L. Bristol, observed that their role had become so important ―that many of our Aviation 
personnel, particularly Army Aviators, will of necessity have to repeat tours in that area 
in order to insure that our U.S. combat operations are properly supported.‖
286
  In June of 
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that year pilots could expect only nine months to a year out of Vietnam before a second 
deployment there; throughout the war the Army tried to maintain a minimum of twelve 
months between tours.
287
 ―Still,‖ Brigadier General Williams quipped, ―a fourth grader 
can tell you very quickly that if you have 10,000 aviators and 5,000 are in Vietnam, then 
one year in and one year out is the best you can do.‖
288
 Vietnam took on priority status 
for the Army‘s worldwide inventory levels. The funnel of pilots to Vietnam downsized 
the personnel levels elsewhere in the world.
289
 The rate at which the Army demanded 
additional pilots quickly outstripped the training schools‘ ability to provide them. 
Consequently, they looked towards their rated-aviators to take up the slack. As a means 
of providing personnel, the Department of the Army temporarily eliminated ground duty 
tours for rated pilots under the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. 
  Career-minded aviators felt the pressure of the situation after suspension of their 
attendance at branch career schools. Furthermore, some aviators found their retirements, 
non-active duty requests, and resignations denied.
290
 Student petitions for removal from 
the aviation program met with almost universal denial from the school, unless in proven 
cases involving ―cowardice, refusal to fly, fear of flying, and flagrant violation of flying 
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regulations.‖
291
 Demand for replacements also modified short-tour deployment 
restrictions. Pilots could receive orders to Vietnam as individual replacements with as 
little as six months left of obligated service in the Army, or to a unit with only three 
months remaining.
292
 Since all qualified pilots from the grade of major on down filled 
cockpit positions, it stocked units with unusually high-ranking aviators.
293
 Out of 
necessity they put their careers on hold, all the while feeling as if they were ―second class 
citizens,‖ and harboring doubts about the future of their careers.
294
 
 Such demands on pilots and their families caused a detrimental effect on the 
retention of career aviators.
295
 The Army understood that their reliance upon experienced 
pilots put added stress on marriages and careers, but quick alternatives were few and far 
between. Brigadier General Williams appealed to the aviation community in mid-1966, 
asking ―each of you to shoulder the burden that has fallen your lot and perform your 
duties in the best manner possible. Talk to your families of the necessity for sacrifice in 
this critical period of our history and stay with the aviation program and the Army if you 
possibly can.‖
296
 During his tenure as Director of Army Aviation, Colonel Bristol 
realized that due to long separation from their loved ones, ―hardships are ahead for many 
of our aviation families.‖
297
 Still, he assured them that ―we are and will continue to take 
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all measures possible to minimize the hardships involved.‖
298
 Along with family 
concerns, officers attempting to continue along the conventional career track worried that 
multiple tours in RVN would necessitate their absence from branch schooling.  
 Their concern was certainly valid, enough so that in 1966 the Army‘s Chief of 
Staff ordered Major General Delk Oden, Director of Officer Personnel, to draft a letter 
for inclusion in the personnel file of every aviator under the grade of Lieutenant 
Colonel.
299
 Oden‘s letter explained to those who might consider the individual for 
promotion or schooling why that person may have not have had the customarily required 
assignments or training. The Army hoped the letter would direct ―each evaluating 
individual to recognize the turbulence in aviator careers, and the reasons for creating this 
turbulence . . . .‖
300
 
 In personal correspondence with Brigadier General Seneff in November 1966, 
Oden reflected on the situation: ―With the present replacement cycle it has become 
almost impossible to manage our aviators‘ careers. We are constantly searching for some 
way to improve this situation to prevent our commissioned aviators from falling behind 
their non-rated contemporaries careerwise [sic].‖
301
 The strain felt by Army Aviation was 
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of concern to many, and as the commanding officer of the 1
st
 Aviation Brigade, Seneff 
knew well the demands of Vietnam and the likelihood of a continued buildup, further 
complicating the matter. He replied that the ―aviator career problem is near and dear to all 
of us. We can‘t keep the wolf from the door indefinitely, and I‘m sure our youngsters are 
really going to feel the pinch in this area in the next year – even worse than the past.‖
302
  
 His solution was one which appealed to most, but did not gain traction throughout 
the Vietnam War. ―Do you suppose it would be the appropriate time,‖ Seneff asked, ―to 
again bring up the subject of a separate Aviation Branch?‖
303
 Some considered such a 
suggestion to be a valid reaction. The aviator attempting to control his career could often 
feel caught between two powerful forces: Army Aviation demanding his continued and 
comprehensive role as a pilot, and fulfilling duties corresponding to his primary branch, 
be they schooling or ground duty deemed to be essential for a ―professional, well 
rounded, experienced officer.‖
304
 As one pilot asked rhetorically in 1966, ―Must the 
Army Aviator continue to split his capabilities? Can he devote 100 percent of his time to 
aviation for extended periods – perhaps three years or more – and then be expected to be 
and to remain an effective branch-qualified officer?‖
305
 Attempts to better the state of 
affairs, to repair the detriments created by the growing need for helicopter pilots, still 
provided little consolation for those facing multiple tours in Vietnam.  
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 Despite attempts to convince aviators that their career possibilities outweighed the 
strenuous demands placed upon them, morale suffered. Quite realistically the Army 
claimed that airmobility would continue growing in size and emphasis. Regardless of the 
career turbulence, it offered them the ability to stand out amongst their peers. Those who 
exhibited ―practical knowledge in the many facets of air mobility, who‘s blessed with 
common sense and an attitude of wanting to really perform and get ahead, cannot be held 
down.‖
306
 Although it was true airmobility was growing at a rapid pace, it did little to 
lessen the sacrifices demanded of the pilot corps. With morale sinking noticeably by early 
1966, attempts at buoying confidence in their career choice may have seemed like hollow 
reassurance. Being a part of Army Aviation was quickly becoming a fate to be avoided. 
  Seneff wrote in late 1965 that through his conversations with numerous young 
aviators he was made aware of the dispirited atmosphere among a number of pilots, 
causing many to leave the Army. ―People simply get fed up with the TDY [temporary 
duty], the tours in undesirable areas, and the hours put in on proving new concepts in 
airmobile units.‖
307
 The reaction among most, Seneff continued, was to ask what they 
were getting in return for their efforts. He argued the answer was simple, if not obvious. 
Among the more lofty outcomes, they were ―making the name Army Aviator a respected 
term both in and out of the service.‖
308
 Additionally, they were assisting their country in a 
time of need, along with learning a specific skill set to which others in the Army did not 
have access. In the purely military realm, though, he estimated that they were ―helping to 
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set a pattern for the future that could considerably change the organization of the United 
States Army and the nature of ground combat.‖
309
 While the majority of young pilots 
may not have viewed their efforts in such a grandiloquent manner, any affirmation that 
their struggles were not going overlooked went a long way.  
Warrant Officers   
 Measures intended to salvage a pilot‘s career at first only extended to 
commissioned officers. Warrant officers, an essential element of Army Aviation, often 
felt the most maligned. They received no special letter in their file explaining the 
extenuating circumstances of Vietnam, nor did they earn the same pay or career benefits 
as their commissioned comrades. On the issue of retention, warrant officers simply felt 
less compelled to extend their careers in the Army, as it mostly guaranteed extensive 
work and sacrifice. The Army‘s intention for the warrant officer to be a ―professional 
aviator, one who devotes all his time to aviation‖ meant a great deal of Vietnam‘s stress 
fell upon them. By 1967 ninety-eight percent of warrant officers were either in Vietnam 
at the time or had already served a tour there.
310
 Though the rank appealed to some –
mainly younger pilots who wished only to fly rather than cultivate a career with the 
attendant responsibilities, training, and expectations – the traditional warrant officers 
could sometimes feel slighted by such divergent career paths, and a lack of opportunities 
regardless of the comparable work load and performance. 
  One pilot noted that the Army relied almost entirely upon warrants to instruct in 
the aviation schools, to instill the type of professional abilities and attitudes expected of 
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the grade.
311
 ―This is the only profession I‘m aware of,‖ he wrote, ―in which the teachers 
make less professional pay (flight pay) than their students (commissioned types).‖ 
312
 A 
sense of alienation, of second citizenship, could also mar any feelings of cohesion, 
because, as in the writer‘s own experience, ―I begin to wonder about my professional 
status when the Colonel begins his little talks not with a greeting to his aviators, but 
rather to ‗officers and warrant officers.‘‖
313
  
 The Army‘s dependence on the warrant officer was certainly never in question. 
Already by 1962 Army Aviation was made aware of the necessity of warrant officers by 
the Howze Board, which called for a one to one ratio of warrant officers to commissioned 
officers by 1967.
314
 Intended solely as pilots, their careers existed distinct from 
commissioned officers in that they were not burdened by matters of leadership. The 
warrant was a ―skilled technician who is provided to fill those positions above the 
enlisted level which are too specialized in scope to permit the effective development and 
continued utilization of a broadly trained, branch-qualified commissioned officer,‖ not a 
leader of men.
315
 As Major General Williams explained it, in Army Aviation ―the warrant 
officer is the ‗Master Craftsman‘ who will spend a full military career flying aircraft. On 
the other hand, the commissioned aviator is assigned to positions that require the exercise 
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of command or require knowledge and decisions regarding tactical or technical 
operations for which only the commissioned officer is trained.‖
316
 For those warrant 
officers concerned about their careers, there were attempts to placate them. Beginning in 
November 1967 the Army reduced the time in service required for promotion from 
warrant officer to chief warrant officer from eighteen to twelve months.
317
  
 Still, not all warrant officers wished to make a career of the Army. Any qualms 
they may have had about the effect of Vietnam upon a potential career were of little 
consequence, considering their main motivation was to fly. Without this enthusiasm to 
fill a limited role, the Army was likely not to meet the personnel quota. In 1966 the Army 
expanded their Warrant Officer Candidate program, hoping to entice men from the 
regular army and civilians to become pilots. ―Aviators are needed,‖ the Army Digest 
declared. ―Never before in Army history has air mobility been as important or as 
extensive as it is in the Republic of Vietnam, where our aviators are daily providing vital 
support to our foot soldiers.‖
318
 The training required four weeks of ―officer candidate 
school-type instruction,‖ whereupon the newly minted warrant officers attended the 
normalized thirty-two week aviation program at Forts Wolters and Rucker.
319
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 The seemingly obvious solution to remedy the lack of pilots was simply to 
increase class sizes coming through the Army‘s aviation schools. In June 1966 the 
Department of the Army predicted that future battlefield needs required over 14,000 
pilots by year‘s end. Compared to the projected strength of only 9,700, the serious 
shortfall revealed a dire situation. Projections into and throughout 1967 recorded the 
requirement at around 21,500 pilots while the Army would have only 12,800 available.
320
 
Despite the strides Army Aviation made throughout the early 1960s in capabilities and 
doctrine, without the adequate numbers of aviators those in charge believed that 
airmobility could possibly falter in Vietnam. Secretary of Defense McNamara authorized 
the Army to increase their overall pilot training output from 120 a month to 425.
321
 Even 
if the aviation schools were able to quickly satisfy such a marked increase in output, they 
would not see the benefits of larger class sizes soon – it required a ―lead time‖ of fifteen 
to eighteen months to ―recruit, train and deploy aviators‖ after authorizing increased 
training outputs.
322
  
 Over the course of fiscal year 1966, Fort Rucker‘s class sizes ballooned from 96 a 
month to 375.
323
 Yet, before the school could meet the goal of 425 students a month the 
demand increased again. In December 1966 the Army approved yet another training 
increase to 625 pilots a month, requiring an expansion of the facilities at Fort Stewart, 
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Georgia, a number not hit until mid-1968.
324
 Fort Rucker continued to meet the demand 
for more pilots in 1968, graduating over 4,500 new Army aviators, and qualifying or 
transitioning another 1,649 into rotary wing aircraft.
325
  
 With the large numbers of new aviators entering the ranks, it was even more 
important the Army maintained the methods of communicating techniques and 
procedures. Training prepared them for the rudiments of combat flying, but as some had 
differentiated, there needed to be a transition from student to pilot. To keep up with the 
incessant need for more pilots the Army expanded the Primary Helicopter Center at Fort 
Wolters, Texas in 1968.
326
 Designed solely in response to Vietnam and the personnel 
issue, the 160 acre installation, Dempsey Army Heliport, was part of a $10 million 
expansion program at Wolters in order to increase the primary phase‘s output by fifty 
percent.
327
 
 Demand for more aviators also meant the Army cut down on the amount of time 
between graduation and assignment to an operational unit in Vietnam. There would be no 
chance to refine what the newly-graduated pilot learned throughout the previous months. 
The training they received at Forts Wolters and Rucker therefore had to provide them 
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with the tools necessary to operate in the combat zone as soon as possible. 
Implementation of a new system in July 1965 divided helicopter flight training into two 
equal blocks between the two training facilities, both phases taking place over sixteen 
weeks each.
328
 The previous program required a 12/20 split – twelve weeks at Primary 
Helicopter School at Fort Wolters and twenty at Fort Rucker – but did not adequately 
prepare pilots to fly immediately in Vietnam. Unique demands required the Army 
implement a system unlike any other service branch. Indeed, none but the Army sent their 
graduates directly to the combat theater without additional specialized training. 
 To an extent the Army Aviation training schools could only provide so many 
rated aviators per training cycle while still imparting upon them the necessary skills to 
survive and operate effectively in combat. Airmobility, merely a controversial concept 
one decade before, was maturing into an essential asset for the U.S. Army, one who had 
become reliant, if not expectant, on the enhanced mobility. Yet, despite this increasing 
need for helicopters, Army Aviation was not fully prepared to meet the demand. 
Although high-ranking officers such as Hamilton Howze had years before predicted the 
need for more personnel, the suggested levels never met the realistic ones.  
Conclusion 
 The communication and dissemination of tactical and procedural innovations 
during the Vietnam War was crucial for varied reasons, first being the relative youth of 
Army Aviation. Despite much pre-Vietnam theorizing regarding the use of airmobility, 
Vietnam was a different environment than what their tests had focused upon. The Army 
could have relied solely upon their prior studies and tests to guide them through Vietnam 
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– the aviation community might have simply argued their doctrine needed no additional 
refinement. Instead, they approached their role and mission with somewhat of an open 
mind, understanding that the lack of a historical precedent of helicopters in 
counterinsurgency required flexibility. Combat had proven some prior ideas as sound, but 
others in need of modification, and that needed a mechanism to properly relay these 
insights. Airmobility, therefore, relied heavily upon young pilots to determine what 
methods would act as its framework.  
 Additionally, the Army needed a means to collect and relay battlefield knowledge 
because of the large amount of pilots they had to train. An increased demand for aviators 
meant relative neophytes to aviation received less than a year of training before flying 
combat missions. Unless the Army had a means of collecting important battlefield 
knowledge and programming it into their curriculum, the new pilot would be a liability. 
Unlike other service branches where potential aviators underwent rigorous and extensive 
training before qualifying to fly in combat, the overwhelming need for helicopters meant 
there would be no such luxury for the rotary-wing pilot. Twelve month tours in Vietnam 
also required the helicopter unit to make their new aviators operationally capable in the 
least amount of time as possible. Thus, in-country orientation alongside veteran pilots 
became a key period of apprenticeship before becoming an aircraft commander.  
  During the early- to mid-1960s Army Aviation was just getting by. Fearing a 
crippling lack of personnel for Vietnam, they attempted to retain as many pilots as they 
could. The sacrifices demanded of helicopter pilots put stress upon families and 
professional ambitions, forcing an unsettling rate of aviators leaving the service. Not only 
did they lose able-bodied men, but more worrisome, they lost the experience these pilots 
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took with them. The Army was not immediately willing, or able, to allow their pilots time 
away from aviation, let alone indulge those concerned about time-intensive career 
development. Keeping the ―wolf from the door‖ as George Seneff put it, placed a 
tremendous strain on the capabilities of Army Aviation to supply the required number of 
pilots while simultaneously looking after their career development. Yet, to their credit, 
the Army did make attempts to look after the pilots from whom they asked so much. As a 
result, they committed to reforms, fighting both to alleviate constraints upon officers‘ 
schooling and assignments, and undertaking a concerted review in 1966 of the warrant 
officer career outlook. A healthy campaign of platitudes advocating the benefits of an 
exciting future for Army Aviation may not have completely solved the morale issue, but 
there was some truth to what they argued. Helicopter crews were pushing the boundaries 
of modern warfare, and along the way they were refining skill sets not commonly 
prevalent. For the young pilot who just wanted to fly, though, all the encouragement they 
needed was the promise of excitement and challenge. Vietnam, to be sure, offered ample 
amounts of each.     
 Army Aviation‘s relative youth during the Vietnam War could have possibly 
proven detrimental. Unlike other branches who entered the war with concrete doctrinal 
perspective born from decades of prior theorizing and experience, the booming aviation 
program underwent rapid testing in combat. Despite this seeming handicap, they met the 
challenge of an insurgency with an embryonic heli-borne concept. Aiding that success 
was their ability to communicate combat experience through multiple channels. This 
allowed not only a free exchange of ideas to better tactics and procedures, but ensured 
that pilots felt their contributions were valued. The history of assault helicopters in 
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Vietnam is a study in doctrinal development through combat experience. It illustrates 
how militaries learn, disseminate, and react to warfare when employing a developing 
capability. Without official reports, service journals, selective school curriculum, and in-
country training, it is doubtful the Army‘s assault helicopter units could have innovated 
as quickly as they did. Their ability to collect and synthesize theories, insights, and 
experience meant that, just as the Army Aviation motto attests, they were above the best. 
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CONCLUSION 
 If one looks no further than the extant literature, it would be easy to believe that 
the United States Army‘s use of assault helicopters during the Vietnam War saw their 
only real test during the Battle of Ia Drang, and from then on enjoyed formulaic 
employment. Indeed, the historical record seemingly does not appreciate the effort put 
forth by Army Aviation after 1965, other than developments in attack helicopter design 
and employment. The experience of the 1
st
 Cavalry Division in November of that year 
was only the start of a continual process of innovation and refinements of tactics and 
procedures amongst assault helicopter units. The formation of the 1
st
 Aviation Brigade in 
1966 signaled the Army‘s growing dependence on rotary wing aircraft. Non-organic 
helicopters augmented the already attached divisional units, giving all infantry commands 
a degree of mobility which previously only the airmobile division enjoyed.  
 These actions were not the sudden outcome of an unforeseen requirement, 
however. To understand how far Army Aviation came in a short time one must appreciate 
that the previous fifteen years set the stage for the eventual helicopter-dependent Army. 
Forward-thinking individuals had for some time envisioned what came to fruition in 
Southeast Asia. Even though the effort to create a capable aviation force at the behest of 
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara related to a European battlefield, it created a 
foundation for the heli-borne concept employed in the brush-fire war of Vietnam. 
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 A perceived emergency need twice resulted in the quick arrival of helicopter 
forces in Vietnam – in 1961 and again in 1965. An eventually ingrained usefulness kept 
them there. When called upon to render assistance, the Army turned to helicopters to 
provide crucial mobility. The ramifications of that decision impacted Army Aviation for 
the rest of the war, and even beyond. For the division‘s seeming victory in November 
1965 convinced decision makers in the Pentagon and elsewhere that reliance on 
helicopters could lead to the successful prosecution of the growing war. In that way, Ia 
Drang is only the beginning of the story. It merely allowed for the developments which 
came later, for the meteoric growth of Army Aviation.
329 
  The increase in rotary-wing aircraft usage gave rise to the careers of those who 
championed airmobility from its early days. Proponents of the concept took important 
and influential positions during the war and after. Widespread use of helicopters 
propelled visionaries like Hamilton H. Howze, Harry W.O. Kinnard, Delk M. Oden, 
George P. Seneff, Jr., Robert M. Williams, George W. Putnam, Jr., Allen M. Burdett, Jr., 
James H. Merryman, and John J. Tolson, among others, to positions of considerable 
influence as they guided the Army‘s aviation program through a period of extraordinary 
transition. Their leadership guarantees mention in any extensive study of the topic, as 
their influence on airmobility put an indelible mark on organization, training, and 
doctrine. 
  In a little over a decade the Army‘s helicopter force emerged from interservice 
struggles with the Air Force to become an acknowledged and appreciated organization. 
One of the positives which arose from a war laden with negatives was the bolstering 
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effect it had upon Army Aviation. In Vietnam those associated with helicopters could 
finally boast that the Army depended upon them, that they had become an essential 
element of the modern military. The strategy of attrition around which the United States 
military based their entire approach in Southeast Asia relied as heavily upon the mobility 
of helicopters as any other technological asset. That is not to say that they constituted the 
sine qua non of the entire American effort in the theater, but their contributions cannot be 
overvalued. Assault helicopter units carried troops to and from the battlefield, provided 
crucial logistical support, and fulfilled virtually any other sundry task which required the 
movement of personnel and material.  
 Though some will continue to argue that the Army was foolish to fight an 
insurgency in the manner they did, their use of helicopters as a counterinsurgent tool was 
largely a product of the Cold War. The United States military found themselves forced to 
―anticipate the requirement to fight anywhere,‖ as Hamilton Howze argued.
330
 ―No other 
nation,‖ he believed, ―not even the USSR, faces so broad a requirement for flexibility of 
application.‖
331
 As a result, the Army‘s structure did not correspond to fighting in any 
one particular environment, and as such it was ―imperfectly organized to cope with any 
of them.‖
332
 Historian Ingo Trauschweizer argues that the Cold War Army, rather than 
focusing on many potential areas of conflict, committed to one. Realizing the 
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impracticality of general-purpose forces, he asserts, the Army primarily aimed to prepare 
for a European war.
333
  
 Army Aviation found themselves providing an all-contingency posture throughout 
their formative years in the 1950s and early 1960s with a European-designed force. 
Nothing illustrated it better than when their helicopters deployed in 1961 against 
guerrillas, while concurrent stateside airmobility tests focused extensively for European 
war. This seeming contradiction in purpose was illustrative of a Cold War necessity, 
which was to an extent a Faustian bargain. It meant chancing that Europe would remain 
the most important threat, at the cost of not having a dedicated organization to respond 
elsewhere. Administration officials believed that military forces meant to fight a 
sophisticated enemy could easily take on one less complex.
334
 Thus, Army helicopters 
became among the first American units to arrive in Southeast Asia. In the main, Army 
Aviation was flexible enough, especially at this early stage, to willingly conform to 
counterinsurgency. It was a prudent decision, as there were few actual alternatives. 
  As the war progressed, demands for men and equipment overstressed the 
capabilities of their providers. Army rotary wing pilot training underwent radical 
expansions to supply enough aviators quickly. Along with the necessary men, the effort 
also required boosts in the numbers of equipment. Bell, the manufacturer of the aircraft 
upon which assault helicopter units relied most, the UH-1, only produced thirty per 
month during mid-1964. By 1967, in direct response to the Army‘s needs in Southeast 
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Asia, they raised their production to 150 per month.
335
 Ultimately, rotary-wing aircraft 
marked the beginning and end of large-scale U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Army 
transportation companies, organizational predecessors to assault helicopter companies, 
were among the first units to arrive in-country. The heart-wrenching closing images of 
the American experience in Southeast Asia also feature the ubiquitous helicopter, 
ferrying desperate crowds from Saigon‘s rooftops in front of an indefatigable North 
Vietnamese advance.  
 The story of Army Aviation in the years following Vietnam finds a lingering 
legacy of their experience there. While true that the war formed them into a capable 
force, the resultant lessons did not find potential applicability in multiple environments – 
not everything assault helicopter units learned there translated into carbon-copy usage 
elsewhere. Southeast Asia, with its mostly low-intensity warfare, was a suitable starting 
point for utilizing helicopters in modern combat, but some still harbored doubts about 
rotary-wing aircraft‘s usefulness in more sophisticated environments. Vietnam had 
demanded much of the Army‘s attention throughout the 1960s, but the specter of Europe 
still loomed. With draw-downs of American forces in Southeast Asia beginning under 
President Richard Nixon‘s Vietnamization program, some in the aviation community 
began focusing their attention back on the European question. By 1973, with the final 
American combat soldier leaving Southeast Asia, many Army aviators were looking far 
beyond that war, seeing it as confined already to the history books – some might say in an 
attempt to forget the experience altogether.  
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 Without doubt, the war had taken a toll on the Army‘s ability to prepare for the 
more menacing scenario of a large-scale war in Europe. While the U.S. military slogged 
through the rice paddies, slashed through jungles, and plodded over the mountains of 
Vietnam, the Soviet Union continually built up their military. By war‘s end, Warsaw Pact 
countries could bring to bear more sophisticated conventional, not to mention nuclear, 
weaponry than the Army was used to fighting. The U.S. Army emerged as a whole from 
Southeast Asia realizing that they were outmatched in the requisite men and equipment to 
fight a possible European war. Too fatigued and jaded by Vietnam, the American public 
was likely not to support a continued high-budget military. Yet, in order to face potential 
threats, the Army could not simply downsize their inventory and personnel in a fashion as 
quickly as prior wars. Into this reality, Army Aviation emerged from a decade of 
counterinsurgent struggle, grasping to determine what applicability the experience had 
towards future conflicts. 
 Not surprisingly, in the early 1970s they looked more forward than they did 
backward. Gone from the pages of many service journals was analysis of 
counterinsurgency, replaced instead by discussions of conventional war.
336
 Visionaries 
posited that to remain a viable force required a new posture, one which stressed Europe 
as the primary field of battle and doctrine which broke the ―bad habits‖ of Vietnam. 
Reflecting on the future, Army Aviation asked where they fit into the reworked 
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European-focused doctrine, with an emphasis on mechanized warfare over the infantry-
heavy Vietnam structure. The 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Middle East provided the 
U.S. Army valuable insight into war against a heavily mechanized Soviet-equipped force. 
In many ways it provided an impetus for Army Aviation planners to adapt quickly their 
tactics and procedures. That war ―clearly announced the arrival of a new spectrum of 
Soviet weapons,‖ which would become ―particularly challenging to aviation 
operations.‖
337
 Tactical analysis of mid-intensity war continued throughout the decade, as 
the military‘s desire to fight another low-intensity Third World counterinsurgency had 
nearly totally abated.    
 In a way, Army Aviation arrived full circle, back again where Southeast Asia 
forced them to depart. The Howze Board‘s recommendations and the resultant tests 
suddenly became as relevant in the post-Vietnam era as it was before 1965. Indeed, the 
tactics might have seemed very familiar to those who experienced the Howze Board‘s 
conceptual formation and 11
th
 Air Assault Division‘s testing. These concepts were not 
new, but Army Aviation ―ignored – or forgot – them during most of the Vietnam 
period.‖
338
 John Tolson argued that while Vietnam had demonstrated their ―terrific 
inherent flexibility by adjusting and modifying tactics to an entirely different 
environment,‖ they needed to ―actually unlearn many procedures we used during recent 
years of combat in Vietnam.‖
339
 Despite the renewed relevancy of the Howze Board‘s 
findings, just as a decade before, budgetary restrictions made them unrealistic. The air 
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assault division, of which Howze originally suggested forming five to be placed around 
the world, ultimately never evolved past the demands Vietnam placed upon it.
340
  
 Army Aviation might have come a long way, but they once again faced many of 
the same criticisms from their early days. Lingering beliefs among airmobility‘s 
opponents upheld that helicopters remained too vulnerable in mid- to high-intensity 
warfare environments. Proponents countered such criticism by upholding that correct 
tactics and techniques – namely nap of the earth flying, very close to the ground surface 
under radar and moving quickly – could lessen helicopter vulnerability, mirroring the line 
of reasoning used a decade earlier by Howze and others.
341
 
  Though the era of fighting for their very existence had passed, Army Aviation 
still had to prove their legitimacy in peacetime. As is common in the times of peace 
which follow extended war, budgetary restrictions forced reevaluations of organization 
and purpose. Yet, like the pre-Vietnam era, much of what Army airmobility practitioners 
debated was still theoretical. The war in Europe never came, and with the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989, along with the tumbling edifice that was the moribund Soviet Union 
two years later, the likelihood of a war on the plains once again diminished.  
 Ultimately, what did Vietnam teach Army Aviation? Of what value in the post-
war era was a decade of operations, of learning and adapting to a counterinsurgency? The 
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denouement of Vietnam was not that it had crippled the once strong organization. Indeed, 
they exited Southeast Asia with the best equipped, most advanced and experienced 
helicopter force ever put to field. General Westmoreland argued that in the Republic of 
Vietnam the Army underwent a ―quiet revolution‖ in the tactics, techniques and 
technology of ground warfare.
342
 That is certainly true of multiple aspects of what they 
experienced there; a more suitable explanation for Army Aviation‘s support of the ground 
war might be a ―quiet evolution,‖ however. Throughout the conflict they gradually 
learned how to employ helicopters in varied tactical environments.  
 In the beginning of American involvement, the Army‘s aircraft operated in a true 
guerrilla war. With the arrival of the 1
st
 Cavalry Division and the Pleiku Campaign, Army 
Aviation learned how to combat regular forces in a conventional warfare setting. The 
subsequent years were a mixture of both counterinsurgent actions and fighting a continual 
conventional war against the NVA. Lam Son 719 and its sophisticated anti-aircraft threat 
taught pilots and crews how to operate in a mid-intensity environment. Though the 
numbers of aviators who gained experience from direct involvement in Laos might have 
been few, comprehensive analysis of the operation ensured those lessons gained a broad 
audience. The Army‘s employment of helicopters in Southeast Asia, therefore, provided 
combat-proven knowledge for distinct environments and tactical applications.     
 Some have seen wasted opportunities in Vietnam‘s aftermath. Observers like 
Major Frank T. Taddonio argue the Army did not take sufficient advantage of the lessons 
they gathered in Southeast Asia – the quick return of focus towards Europe did not 
exploit ten years of combat airmobile operations. Taddonio posits that the Army became 
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preoccupied with attack helicopters in a conventional war during the 1970s and 1980s, 
―while the lessons of airmobility learned in Vietnam faded like a bad dream.‖
343
 To an 
extent, he is correct. Institutional antipathy towards an entire war negatively tainted 
potentially helpful doctrine. Vietnam may not have contributed a direct transposition of 
tactics and procedures into a European environment, but it provided a framework for 
future war. Effectively, it was a ―building block to the future,‖ where Army Aviation 
―practiced the principles of war.‖
344
 Their job, then, was to employ the fundamentals 
devised in Southeast Asia and tailor new techniques and tactics for likely conflicts. 
  More importantly, though, Vietnam‘s largest contribution to the future of Army 
Aviation was in terms of personal experience. Many of the commanding officers in the 
following decades, both infantry and aviation, had completed combat tours in Southeast 
Asia. They retained first-hand knowledge about the employment of helicopters in warfare 
and easily constituted the most experienced heli-borne military in the world – no other 
force could claim the extent of combat accomplishments or battlefield knowledge than 
the U.S. Army. Those who did not remain in the active service found a welcome home in 
the burgeoning National Guard or Reserves. Merely a skeleton force during the Vietnam 
War struggling with outdated equipment and senior pilots, the 1970s inactive Army grew 
in men, equipment, and capabilities.
345
 Would their country call upon them, they 
constituted an-already experienced force, most with combat flight hours and competent 
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aviators.
346
 Army Aviation emerged from a decade of war a more respectable 
organization that specialized in a proven concept, portending a bright future.  
 The legacy of Vietnam, despite the Army‘s return to a Euro-centric view of future 
war for decades following, is still felt today. Operation Desert Storm in 1990 might not 
have given Army Aviation much of an opportunity to refine their operations, but their 
impressive performance is testament to sound preparation and training. Though the wars 
in which the Army currently finds itself are dissimilar to what they experienced in 
Southeast Asia, the principles are still the same – to provide the infantry enhanced 
mobility against an insurgency. It is unlikely they will again experience a period of such 
vibrant developments and rapid maturity as Vietnam provided.  
 The solidification of doctrine which George Seneff so incessantly demanded, and 
the decades of experience which he bemoaned Army Aviation lacked, have now come to 
fruition. Even in 1966 Hamilton Howze could foresee the future benefit of Vietnam. 
―What, from a purely military point of view, will come out of the war in Vietnam?‖ he 
asked. Experience, he argued, would be the largest benefit. The Army would be able to 
boast they were the ―most experienced, modern, battle-wise‖ force in the world. More 
importantly, though, is that the bulk of their experience and wisdom ―will pertain to the 
use of the air that lies close to the tree tops.‖
347
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